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WHEN CAN A STATE SUE THE
UNITED STATES?
Tara Leigh Grove†
State suits against the federal government are on the rise.
From Massachusetts’ challenge to federal environmental policy, to Oregon’s confrontation over physician-assisted suicide,
to Texas’s suit over the Obama administration’s immigration
program, States increasingly go to court to express their disagreement with federal policy. This Article offers a new theory
of state standing that seeks to explain when a State may sue
the United States. I argue that States have broad standing to
sue the federal government to protect state law. Accordingly,
a State may challenge federal statutes or regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of,
state law. But, contrary to many scholars and jurists, I contend that States do not have a special interest in overseeing
the manner in which federal agencies implement federal law.
The Supreme Court was therefore wrong to suggest that
States deserve “special solicitude” in the standing analysis
when they seek to ensure that the federal executive abides by
congressional mandates. States have special standing to
protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.
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INTRODUCTION
State suits against the federal government are on the rise.
States have objected to federal policy on immigration,1 the environment,2 and health insurance,3 among other areas.4 Al1
See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743, 748–54 (5th Cir. 2015)
(upholding state standing to challenge the federal executive’s Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program); Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 247, 252 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying Mississippi standing to
challenge the federal executive’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program);
see also Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 664 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) (“assum[ing], without deciding, that the plaintiffs have standing” to challenge the
federal executive’s alleged “fail[ure] to control illegal immigration”); California v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 1997) (failing to comment on
California’s standing in a similar suit); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463,
465–66 (3d Cir. 1996) (failing to comment on New Jersey’s standing in a similar
suit).
2
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505–06 (2007) (upholding
state standing in a suit challenging the EPA’s failure to regulate motor vehicle
emissions); Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 198–99 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (denying standing when States objected to the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas emissions);
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1130 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding Alabama and Florida’s standing “to ensure the [federal executive’s]
compliance with federal law” because the agency’s decision could “adversely impact the environment and economy” of the States).
3
See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266 (4th Cir.
2011) (denying state standing in a constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care
Act’s individual mandate provision, although noting that the district court found
standing).
4
See, e.g., Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 674 F.3d 1220, 1223–24, 1238
(10th Cir. 2012) (denying state standing to challenge federal regulations governing
snowmobile use); Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. United States, 369 F. Supp.
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though some of these lawsuits challenge the constitutionality
of federal legislation, state officials often—and, it seems, increasingly—take aim at the manner in which federal agencies
administer (or fail to administer) federal statutes.5 The
Supreme Court signaled its endorsement of such lawsuits in
Massachusetts v. EPA.6 The Court upheld the State’s standing
to challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, declaring that Massachusetts was “entitled to special
solicitude in our standing analysis.”7 As scholars have observed, the decision in Massachusetts suggests that “states
should be accorded special access to federal court in order to
challenge federal agency action.”8 That is, “states have a special role in monitoring and improving” federal agencies’ implementation of federal law.9
Many scholars have welcomed these state-led lawsuits as a
crucial new check on the administrative state.10 Accordingly,
2d 237, 239–42, 244–48 (D. Conn. 2005) (upholding state standing to challenge,
only on Tenth Amendment grounds, a federal statute and regulations governing
the fishing industry); Kansas ex rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797,
798–99, 801–02 (D. Kan. 1990) (upholding standing where State alleged that the
Federal Emergency Management Agency had improperly failed to declare a particular region a “major disaster”).
5
See supra notes 1–4; see also Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New
Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525,
533 (1994) (“[I]n recent years states have increasingly asked federal judges to
compel the federal government to enforce its laws and regulatory standards.”);
Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273, 287 (2007) (finding an increase in such suits
beginning in the 1990s).
6
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
7
Id. at 519–21. Some scholars predicted that the decision would “encourage
states and state AGs to file suits against the federal government.” E.g., Bradford
Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701,
1780 (2008).
8
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 67–68 (2011); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard
of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 494–95 (2012) (noting that
Massachusetts “may suggest a broad role for states in challenging federal executive action—and federal executive inaction,” although expressing uncertainty
about the decision’s long-term impact); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State
Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 73–74 (2007) (“This
‘special solicitude’ rule gives states a favored status when bringing suits against
federal administrative agencies.”).
9
Metzger, supra note 8, at 67.
10
See, e.g., Mank, supra note 7, at 1771-72 (“agree[ing] with the Massachusetts majority that states” may bring suit “if the federal government has allegedly
failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty”); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REV. 249, 276 (2009) (arguing that
broad state standing “does no more than ensure that executive discretion is
confined within the boundaries of the Constitution and federal law”); Jonathan
Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1073–74 (2010) (argu-
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commentators have urged the judiciary to grant States “special” standing to challenge federal agency action (and inaction).11 Although the reaction in the lower courts has been
mixed,12 recent events suggest the long-term significance of the
Court’s standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA. In 2014,
Texas and twenty-five other States challenged the Obama administration’s “deferred action” program, which allows certain
undocumented immigrants with close ties to the United States
to remain in the country.13 The States argued that the federal
executive violated its duty to properly enforce federal immigration law. In upholding state standing, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals underscored that Texas “is entitled to the same ‘special
solicitude’ as was Massachusetts.”14
I seek to challenge this concept of “special” state standing
to police the federal administrative state.15 I argue that States
ing that States are entitled to “special solicitude” to challenge an agency’s failure
to regulate when state law is preempted); Robert A. Weinstock, Note, The Lorax
State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798,
834 (2009) (asserting that States should have standing to object to the executive’s
implementation of federal law, even when private parties do not); Sara Zdeb, Note,
From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae
Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1079 (2008)
(advocating state suits to challenge “an agency’s failure to enforce the law”).
Notably, Gillian Metzger’s endorsement is more qualified. See Metzger, supra note
8, at 67–75 (exploring the possibility that States may be effective monitors of
federal agencies, but suggesting that Congress should decide whether States
ought to play such a special role).
11
See sources cited supra note 10. Even before Massachusetts v. EPA, many
commentators urged courts to grant States broad standing to challenge federal
agency action. See, e.g., Case Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: State Parens Patriae Standing in Suits Against Federal Agencies, 61 MINN. L. REV. 691, 702 (1977)
(arguing that States can help ensure that a federal agency “act[s] in conformity
with its statutory authority”); Gary Igal Strausberg, The Standing of a State as
Parens Patriae to Sue the Federal Government, 35 FED. B.J. 1, 20 (1976) (same);
see also Comment, State Standing To Challenge Federal Administrative Action: A
Re-Examination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1090–92
(1977) (advocating state standing to “seek review of federal agency action allegedly
inconsistent with a federal statute” because of the States’ role in implementing
administrative programs).
12
See cases cited supra notes 1–4.
13
Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015).
14
Id. at 752. I discuss below Texas’s argument that it has standing to protect
its state driver’s license regime. See Part II.A.3 (discussing the case and urging
that Texas’s suit is not aimed at redressing this alleged injury). Notably, the
Texas case was pending before the Supreme Court when this Article went to print.
15
Notably, I focus here on “special” state standing—that is, instances when a
State may bring suit, even when a private party could not. I do not question that a
State has standing to bring suit (against the federal government or another defendant) when it asserts a concrete injury in fact that would be sufficient for a private
party. Thus, for example, if the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA had
concluded that either a State or a private party with substantial coastal property
could challenge the EPA’s failure to regulate motor vehicle emissions, then that
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are entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis in
only one context: when they seek to enforce or defend state law.
I further contend that States may assert that sovereign interest
against the federal government; thus, States have broad standing to challenge federal statutes and regulations that preempt,
or otherwise undermine the continued enforceability of, state
law. But States do not have a special interest in the manner in
which the federal executive enforces federal law.16
This state-law focused conception of state standing accords with the constitutional design. As Ernest Young and
other federalism scholars have observed, “virtually all the values that federalism is supposed to promote . . . turn on the
capacity of the states to exercise self-government.”17 States
therefore should have standing to challenge federal action that
preempts, or otherwise undermines the enforceability of, state
law—and thereby hinders the capacity of States to exercise
self-government. By contrast, it is hard to see how States have
a special interest—over and above that of private parties, localities, or even Congress itself—in the federal executive’s compliance with federal statutes. In sum, I argue that States have
broad standing to protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.18
Moreover, articulating a limiting principle for special state
standing also serves Article III values. Standing doctrine is
designed in part to identify when litigants have an interest that
merits judicial resolution, while leaving many other matters to
the political process.19 As the judiciary has long recognized,
state governments must have the authority to enforce and to
protect the continued enforceability of their laws in court; abcase would not be an example of “special” state standing. However, the Court’s
reasoning, combined with the Justices’ comments during oral argument, strongly
suggest that the Court would not have granted standing to such a private party.
See infra notes 173–175 and accompanying text.
16
My focus here is on state standing to challenge the federal government’s
implementation of federal law. I therefore do not address the important, but
separate, question of the standing of state institutions to challenge state law—the
issue in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). See id. at 2658–59, 2665–66 (holding that the state
legislature had standing to challenge a state initiative permitting an independent
commission to draw electoral districts).
17
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
4 (2004); see infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
18
Notably, I do not assert that a State has standing to challenge any federal
action that arguably undermines federalism, such as a statute that may exceed
federal power. Instead, my contention is that state standing to preserve state law
helps to serve core federalism principles. See infra Part I.D.
19
See infra notes 153-155, 170-172 and accompanying text.

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN402.txt

856

unknown

Seq: 6

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-MAY-16

16:26

[Vol. 101:851

sent such a power, States could not enforce many laws at all.20
This longstanding rule helps to justify broad state standing to
protect state law, including (as I argue below) in suits against
the federal government.21 By contrast, a more expansive definition of special state standing might threaten to erode the
limits on the Article III judicial power—by enabling every dispute between a State and the federal government to wind up in
court.22
My primary goal is to show that this state-law focused
approach to state standing better accords with both precedent
and constitutional principle.23 But I also believe that this theory has other strong normative underpinnings. Recent political
science and legal scholarship suggests that state attorneys
general, who are elected in most states, have strong political
and institutional incentives to respect state constituent preferences.24 Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that the Massachusetts attorney general attacked the executive’s nonenforcement of federal environmental law, while Texas officials
took aim at the executive’s immigration program. The institutional design and political incentives of state attorneys general
seem to make them well-suited to represent state interests,
including the interest in protecting state law against federal
interference.25 But these features provide no basis for presuming that state attorneys general should have a special role in
protecting the national interest in executive compliance with
federal law.
20

See infra Part I.A–C.
See infra Part I.B-C.
22
I recognize that standing doctrine is a deeply contested area of jurisprudence. See infra note 154 (citing some of the scholarly critiques of standing
doctrine). For purposes of this analysis, I assume that the Constitution does
place limits on the types of “injuries” that can be adjudicated in federal court.
Given that assumption, I seek here to identify a limiting principle for “special”
state standing (that is, the standing that States enjoy over and above that of
private parties). I believe that the principle offered here makes the most sense of
precedent as well as federalism and Article III values.
23
I do not seek here to demonstrate that the original meaning of Article III
either clearly compels, or forecloses, this argument about state standing. As
described below, due to restrictions on federal jurisdiction, States could not bring
suit in lower federal courts until 1875; they were confined to the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction (which the Court has long read more narrowly than the text of
Article III might allow). See infra notes 61, 89, 110 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, I believe it is hard to make definitive claims about the original meaning of Article III in the context of state standing. Instead, I seek to provide the best
account of our state standing precedents, as shaped by history and constitutional
principle.
24
See infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text.
25
See infra Part II.B.
21
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This analysis has important implications for both current
litigation and legal scholarship. First, I challenge the commentary and case law that endorse special state standing to police
the administrative state.26 States have no special interest in
the federal executive’s enforcement of federal law. Second, I
also seek to push against a very different strain in the state
standing literature. Prominent scholars—first, Alexander
Bickel and, more recently, Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins—have argued against any state sovereign standing to sue
the federal government.27 I argue, by contrast, that States may
bring suit against the federal government to protect the continued enforceability of state law.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I argues that States
have broad standing to protect state law from federal interference. However, as both Part I and Part II emphasize, States
may challenge only federal statutes or regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the enforceability of, state law
and may seek redress only for that harm. States have no special standing to ensure that federal agencies properly implement federal law. Part II further asserts that this approach to
state standing is supported by functional considerations, given
the institutional design and incentives of the office of state
attorney general.

26

See supra notes 10–11, 14 and accompanying text.
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79,
85–90 (arguing that broad state standing “would make a mockery . . . of the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael
G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 396–97 (1995) (recommending that
the judiciary “limit states’ pursuit of their sovereignty interests in the federal
courts”); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, States’ Rights and State Standing, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 845, 849–50 (2012) (contending that States may sue the federal
government only to protect their own “federal interests”—rights conferred by the
Constitution or federal law—and not to challenge federal preemption). Notably,
Professor Bickel suggested that States lack Article III standing to sue the federal
government to protect state law. Professor Woolhandler’s recent work suggests
that she does not believe such suits are barred by Article III but instead that
courts should refuse to permit such actions, absent congressional authorization.
Compare Bickel, supra, at 89–90 (suggesting that States lack Article III standing
in this context), with Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 236 (2014) (arguing that state sovereign actions require
congressional authorization). I also dispute Professor Woolhandler’s assertion
about the need for congressional authorization. See infra notes 167–169 and
accompanying text. I do not, however, contend that States have special standing
to “articulate and defend individual rights.” Contra Timothy Sandefur, State
Standing to Challenge Ultra Vires Federal Action: The Health Care Cases and
Beyond, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313 (2012).
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I
THE SCOPE OF STATE STANDING
Article III provides that the federal “judicial Power shall
extend to [certain] Cases . . . [and] Controversies” involving
both the United States and the States.28 But the constitutional
text is noticeably silent about what types of “cases” and “controversies” governments may bring—that is, about the scope of
governmental standing. As scholars have begun to recognize,
other constitutional principles and provisions help inform the
meaning of Article III “cases” and “controversies” in this
context.29
One of those background principles is the concept that a
sovereign government must have standing to enforce and defend its laws in court. Indeed, this principle is so uncontroversial that the Supreme Court rarely considers the standing of
the state or federal government to pursue those sovereign interests. Standing issues tend to arise only when, for example,
the government declines to defend its laws,30 or (relatedly) private parties seek to enforce or defend laws on the government’s
28

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2.
See, e.g., Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 585, 589 (2015) (arguing that due process and separation of powers
principles inform standing doctrine); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article
III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1314–16 (2014) [hereinafter Grove, Standing Outside]
(arguing that Article II and Article I help define the scope and limits of executive
and legislative standing to represent the United States); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal
Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
571, 627–28 (2014) (arguing that structural principles, particularly bicameralism
and the separation of law enactment from law implementation, “help explain why
the House and the Senate have standing to enforce committee subpoenas but lack
standing to defend federal laws”); see also Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy
Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243, 296–306
(2011) (arguing that state enforcement of federal criminal law would raise Article
II questions under the Take Care and Appointments Clauses as well as standing
questions). Scholars have further argued that these broader structural considerations inform the scope of private party standing. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing
as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 790–92 (2009);
Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions
Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2256 (1999). Some of the early state standing cases discussed
here may also have been influenced by assumptions about the scope of the federal
judiciary’s equitable powers. See infra Part I.B; see also Kristin Collins, Article III,
Social Movements, and the Making of the Modern Federal Courts 5 (draft on file
with author) (discussing how many early twentieth-century observers asserted
that the federal courts’ equitable powers were an integral part of the Article III
judicial power).
30
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013). Courts have
also considered the standing of the federal executive when it has filed suit to
protect the rights of private parties. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “the United States may not
29

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN402.txt

unknown

Seq: 9

4-MAY-16

2016] WHEN CAN A STATE SUE THE UNITED STATES?

16:26

859

behalf.31 Accordingly, in sharp contrast to private parties,32
governments may invoke federal jurisdiction to enforce or to
protect the continued enforceability of their laws, absent any
showing of concrete injury.33
To the extent that scholars have commented upon government standing, they have generally emphasized its breadth—
that is, how governments may invoke federal jurisdiction when
private parties cannot.34 But I argue that, at least with respect
to state governments,35 this background principle of sovereignty not only broadens but also helps define the limits of
state standing. States have a special capacity to invoke federal
jurisdiction only to enforce, or to protect the continued enforceability of, state law.
A. The States’ Special Standing
Although federal and state governments often enforce and
defend their laws in their own court systems, States must at
times pursue these interests in federal court.36 I begin here
sue [a local police department] to enjoin violations of individuals’ fourteenth
amendment rights without specific statutory authority”).
31
See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 773–74 (2000) (holding that a private qui tam relator had “representational
standing” to enforce the False Claims Act on behalf of the United States); infra
notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
32
To establish standing, a private party must demonstrate a concrete injury
that was caused by the defendant and that can be redressed by the requested
relief. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). A private party cannot
sue simply to enforce federal law. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).
33
See infra Part I.A.; see also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895) (the federal
government’s “obligation[ ] . . . to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the
wrongdoing of one . . . , is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court”).
34
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and
Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 667
(2006) (“In suits by the government, courts characteristically make no inquiry into
injury.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment,
103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 627 (2005) (“Federal courts regularly adjudicate government enforcement actions that would lack ‘injury in fact’ if brought by private
plaintiffs.”).
35
In earlier work, I examined the limits on the power of the federal executive
branch and Congress to bring suit in federal court. See Grove, Standing Outside,
supra note 29.
36
Beginning in 1815, Congress allowed federal revenue officers to remove
state court actions, including criminal prosecutions, to federal court. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 267–69, 271 (1879) (holding that Congress had properly authorized removal of a state court criminal prosecution for murder, even if it
required a federal court to “administer[ ] the State’s criminal law”). In the postCivil War era, Congress also authorized private individuals to remove state court
actions, if they could show that the state courts would not protect their civil
rights. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 794–805 (1966); see also Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1879) (concluding that removal of a murder prose-
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with a relatively uncontroversial context: cases in which States
assert their interest in state law in suits against private parties.
I argue that the litigation between States and private parties
suggests both the breadth and the boundaries of special state
standing—boundaries that also apply in litigation against the
United States.
A State must often defend its laws in federal court against
constitutional challenge.37 The State need not, of course,
demonstrate standing when a private party invokes federal jurisdiction by bringing suit. But the State must have standing
to appeal.38 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees39 offers an illustration.
The case arose out of a determination by a Minnesota state
agency that the Jaycees, a private social club, had violated
state antidiscrimination law by excluding women.40 The
Jaycees brought suit in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the State’s effort to force them to accept female
members violated their First Amendment right to freedom of
association.41 When the Jaycees prevailed in the lower court,
no one doubted the State’s standing to appeal to defend its law
against that constitutional challenge.42
Maine v. Taylor43 even more clearly illustrates the breadth
of state standing to defend state law. The case arose out of a
criminal prosecution brought by the federal government. Federal officials charged the defendant with violating a federal statute that prohibited, among other things, the importation of fish
cution was improper under the statute); Collins & Nash, supra note 29, at 278–84
(discussing the removal statutes). Notably, the Supreme Court has not doubted
state standing to appeal cases removed under these provisions—even when the
State’s only interest was the enforcement of state criminal law. See, e.g., Georgia,
384 U.S. at 792–93, 805–06 (ruling on the merits of the State’s appeal and concluding that removal was proper).
37
See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015) (seeking review of a decision striking down an application of
the State’s specialty license program on First Amendment grounds); Florida v.
Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 55–56 (2010) (seeking review of a decision setting aside a
robbery conviction on Fifth Amendment grounds); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (noting that a State’s
sovereign interests are “regularly at issue in constitutional litigation”).
38
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (“[S]tanding ‘must
be met by persons seeking appellate review . . . .’” (quoting Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997))); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing” standing).
39
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
40
See id. at 612–16.
41
See id. at 615–16.
42
The Court ultimately upheld the application of the state antidiscrimination
law to the Jaycees. See id. at 623, 631.
43
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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or wildlife “‘in violation of any law or regulation of any State.’”44
The defendant argued that the state law at issue in his case (a
Maine statute governing the importation of live baitfish) was
unconstitutional, and Maine intervened to defend its law.45
When a lower federal court held the state law invalid (and,
thus, an improper basis for the federal prosecution), the federal
government did not seek further review; only Maine took the
case to the Supreme Court.46 The criminal defendant objected
that Maine lacked “standing to appeal the reversal of a federal
conviction.”47 The Court acknowledged that a State may not
have a “legally cognizable interest in the prosecutorial decisions of the Federal Government” but nevertheless upheld
state standing, declaring that “a State clearly has a legitimate
interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes.”48
In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court has made clear that
private parties generally lack standing to protect the “continued enforceability” of state law, absent a showing of concrete
injury.49 For example, in Diamond v. Charles, the Court held
that a private individual, who strongly opposed abortion,
lacked standing to defend a restrictive Illinois abortion statute,
after state officials declined to do so.50 “Because the State
alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State has . . . [a]
‘direct stake’” in defending its law.51 Likewise, in Hollingsworth
v. Perry, the Court rejected private party standing to defend a
state law banning same-sex marriage.52 The Court declared
that the private actors’ “only interest was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law. . . .

44

Id. at 132–33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (2012)).
See id. at 133 (noting that the criminal defendant argued that the state law
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) (2012)
(permitting a State to intervene to defend the constitutionality of its statutes).
46
See Maine, 477 U.S. at 133, 136–37.
47
Id. at 133, 136.
48
Id. at 137.
49
In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court left open the possibility that private
parties could be appointed as “agents” of the State, but indicated that there are
significant restrictions on a State’s capacity to appoint private agents. See 133 S.
Ct. at 2665–67 (2013).
50
See 476 U.S. 54, 64–67 (1986).
51
Id. at 65 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)); see also
id. at 62 (“Had the State of Illinois . . . sought review . . . , the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’
requirement would have been met, for a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.”).
52
See 133 S. Ct. at 2662–68.
45

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN402.txt

862

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

4-MAY-16

16:26

[Vol. 101:851

[S]uch a ‘generalized grievance’—no matter how sincere—is insufficient to confer standing” on private parties.53
These cases leave little doubt that the judiciary has long
accorded States “special solicitude” in the standing analysis,
particularly as compared to private parties. A State may enforce or defend state law, absent any showing of concrete injury. But these precedents do not suggest that States have
unlimited power to invoke federal jurisdiction. A State has
special standing to assert its interest in enforcing, and protecting the continued enforceability of, its own state law. It follows
that States can invoke federal jurisdiction only to prevent and
to seek redress for harms to that sovereign interest.54
Accordingly, Minnesota could appeal and defend its law in
the Jaycees case—both to stop the Jaycees from violating its
civil rights law and to ensure the continued enforceability of its
law against similar groups. But Minnesota could not bring suit
against the Jaycees for, say, violating Wisconsin civil rights
laws. Nor could Minnesota object if Wisconsin enforced (or
declined to enforce) its own civil rights laws against the
Jaycees. “Because the State alone is entitled to create a legal
code, only the State has . . . [a] ‘direct stake’” in enforcing or
defending its law.55
Likewise, in Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court did not
conclude that Maine had standing to assert the federal government’s interest in prosecuting the criminal defendant. The
Court instead upheld Maine’s standing to protect the “continued enforceability” of its own state law.56 The State had standing to seek redress only for the violation of its own sovereign
interests, not those of the federal government.

53
Id. at 2656; cf. id. at 2664 (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable
interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws . . . .” (quoting Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986))).
54
Accordingly, the “special” standing of state governments may be understood in terms similar to the traditional injury, causation, and redressability test
for private parties. State standing differs from that of private parties principally at
the injury prong: a State need not show a concrete “injury-in-fact” but instead
suffers a judicially cognizable injury—and can bring suit or appeal—when its
state law is violated or declared invalid (and thus no longer enforceable). But the
State is still confined to redressing that injury by bringing an enforcement action
against an alleged violator or appealing a lower court ruling that declares its law
invalid.
55
Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 740).
56
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986).
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B. State Standing Against the United States: Historical
Background
States have standing to protect the continued enforceability of state law—not only in suits against private parties but
also against the United States. Notably, the key precedents
supporting this point have been largely overlooked in the state
standing literature.57 Instead, scholars are far more familiar
with an important limitation on state standing to sue the
United States. In Massachusetts v. Mellon,58 the Supreme
Court announced that a State cannot bring an action against
the federal government as parens patriae—that is, as the representative of private citizens to enforce their federal rights. “In
that field,” the Court declared, “it is the United States, and not
the State, which represents [private citizens] as parens patriae.”59 Whatever the scope of that prohibition,60 the precedents (including Mellon itself) make clear that this rule does not
cast doubt on state standing to ensure the continued enforceability of state law.
These precedents, however, also underscore the boundaries of such state standing. States may challenge only federal
statutes or regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine
the continued enforceability of, state law. And States may seek
57
That is true, despite the fact that early twentieth-century commentators
discussed these cases as standing cases. See sources cited infra note 101. I have
found no modern references to Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925). And although Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), is well-known as a treaty power
case, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1867, 1868 (2005), it has often been overlooked (or misread) in the state
standing literature. Some legal commentators have (incorrectly) treated the case
as one recognizing state standing to assert proprietary rights. See, e.g., Bickel,
supra note 27, at 88 & n.34; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II et al., State Sovereign
Standing: Often Overlooked, but Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 103 n.72
(2012), and some commentators appear to have overlooked the case entirely, see,
e.g., Vladeck, supra note 27, at 851 (failing to mention Missouri in a careful piece
analyzing state standing to “challenge the constitutionality of a federal statute” on
preemption grounds); Katherine Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State
Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2011) (failing to mention Missouri).
58
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
59
Id. at 485–86; see also Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927) (citing
Massachusetts v. Mellon in a decision denying state standing in a parens patriae
action against the federal government).
60
See Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 225–26 & 225 n.88 (noting the debate
over this issue). For present purposes, I assume that the bar on state parens
patriae suits against the federal government is a constitutional rule (although I
acknowledge that is a contestable assumption). My goal is to show that, even if
one makes this assumption, there is still a strong case for state standing to
protect state law from federal interference. See also infra notes 150–152,
165–166 and accompanying text (distinguishing parens patriae suits from state
suits to protect state law).
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redress only for that harm—by requesting that the preemption
be lifted, so that the State may once again enforce its law as it
sees fit.
1. State Standing in the Lower Courts
The Supreme Court has long recognized the authority of
States to sue the federal government to protect state law—at
least when the action was commenced in lower federal court.61
(I discuss below the more nuanced history of the Court’s original jurisdiction.62) In Missouri v. Holland,63 for example, the
State challenged on Tenth Amendment grounds the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which prohibited the hunting of certain
wild birds.64 Missouri alleged that it could bring the suit for
two separate reasons. First, the State had long regulated the
hunting of wild birds, and the new federal statute “directly . . .
conflict[ed]” with its more permissive state laws.65 Accordingly,
the federal statute “infringe[d] upon [the State’s] sovereign right
. . . to control and regulate the taking, killing and use of wild
game within its borders.”66 Second, the State alleged (apparently, for the first time in the Supreme Court) its “ownership” of
61
Notably, this history of state standing in the lower federal courts does not
date back to the Founding. The lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction over stateinitiated suits until 1875, see infra note 89, and state suits against the federal
government do not appear to have become common until the early twentieth
century. Nevertheless, during that era, the Court does not appear to have seriously questioned state standing to protect state law in the lower federal courts,
despite the fact that the Court was quite hostile to such state standing in its
nineteenth-century original jurisdiction cases. See infra note 89 (discussing original jurisdiction cases like Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50, 76–77
(1867)). Indeed, the Court permitted many suits in which the State challenged
federal preemption without discussing standing. See, e.g., Alabama v. United
States, 325 U.S. 535, 536–37 (1945) (deciding on the merits a suit by States
challenging an Interstate Commerce Commission order that would preempt intrastate railroad rates); North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 508–09,
519–20 (1945) (deciding on the merits a state suit against an ICC order that would
preempt intrastate railroad rates); Transit Commission v. United States, 284 U.S.
360, 367–68 (1932) (rejecting as “without merit” a state suit alleging that an
Interstate Commerce Commission order constituted an “unconstitutional invasion of the state’s sovereignty”); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591, 597–602
(1922) (deciding on the merits New York’s suit against the Interstate Commerce
Commission challenging a federal order that preempted state rules governing
intrastate railroad rates).
62
See infra Part I.B.2.
63
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
64
See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755–57 (1918) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)); Missouri, 252 U.S. at 430–31.
65
See Missouri’s Motion to Advance at 2–4, Missouri, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609).
66
Id. at 2.
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all the wild game in its territory and that the federal law interfered with this “property right.”67
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, held
that Missouri could bring the suit. Notably, although the Court
recognized that the State “allege[d] a pecuniary interest, as
owner of the wild birds within its borders,”68 the Court did not
uphold state standing on this ground. The Court held instead
that Missouri’s bill in equity was “a reasonable and proper
means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State.”69
It is important to understand what Justice Holmes meant
by the State’s “quasi sovereign rights.” Today, jurists and
scholars often associate the term with parens patriae standing,
the authority of a State to bring suit on behalf of private citizens, largely because that is how the Supreme Court used the
term in a 1982 case.70 But Justice Holmes was using the term
“quasi-sovereign” in a very different sense—to refer to the
State’s sovereign interest in the continued enforceability of
state law.71 Indeed, that was the injury claimed by Missouri.
The State alleged that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act preempted
state law and thereby “infringe[d] upon [its] sovereign right” to
regulate hunting “within its borders.”72 Other passages of the
opinion confirm that the Court was focused on this interest.
Justice Holmes observed: “To put the claim of the State upon
67
I have canvassed the filings in the case. The State did not clearly raise a
property interest until the Supreme Court. See Brief of Appellant at 2, 13–14,
Missouri, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609).
68
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 431.
69
Id.; see also id. at 431 (“The ground of the bill [in equity] is that . . . the acts
of the defendant done and threatened under that authority invade the sovereign
right of the State and contravene its will manifested in statutes.”). As noted
above, these early state standing precedents may have been influenced in part by
assumptions about the scope of the federal judiciary’s equitable powers. See
supra note 29. A full examination of the possible relationship between state
standing and federal equity is beyond the scope of this Article. But I am grateful
to John Harrison for pointing out this potential link.
70
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
602 (1982) (“Quasi-sovereign interests . . . are not sovereign interests, [or] proprietary interests . . . . They consist of a set of interests that the State has in the wellbeing of its populace.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public
Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 303–04 (2005) (noting the Court’s use of the
term parens patriae to refer to the State’s “‘quasi-sovereign’ interests” (quoting
Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601–02)). Notably, courts and commentators also at
times use the term parens patriae to refer to a State’s sovereign interest in enforcing its laws; yet they still differentiate “sovereign” from “quasi-sovereign” interests. See Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General
Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1859, 1863–71 (2000).
71
See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
72
Missouri’s Motion to Advance at 2, Missouri, 252 U.S. 416 (No. 609).
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title is to lean upon a slender reed.”73 Instead, the State’s claim
was that “but for the treaty the State would be free to regulate
this subject itself.”74 (The Court, however, upheld the federal
statute as a lawful exercise of the treaty power.75)
At the time that Justice Holmes wrote, it would not have
seemed odd for the Court to use the term “quasi-sovereign” to
refer to Missouri’s “sovereign” interest in state law. During that
era, “quasi-sovereign” was often used to refer to the fact that a
State’s “sovereignty” was limited and could be overridden by
the federal government.76 That is, States were not fully sovereign; they were only quasi-sovereign. But States had standing
to protect their “quasi-sovereign” interest in the continued enforceability of state law.
A few years later (and, notably, after Massachusetts v. Mellon), the Court reaffirmed this doctrine of “quasi-sovereign”
standing to sue the United States. In Colorado v. Toll, the State
challenged a regulation issued by the Director of the National
Park Service to govern “chauffeur services” in Rocky Mountain
National Park (that is, businesses that transported tourists
around the park).77 The State alleged that the federal regulations, as applied, conflicted with—and thus preempted—a
state law governing the chauffeur industry.78 The federal government responded that the State could not bring the suit,
because the State was not itself engaged in the chauffeur in73

Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434.
Id.
75
See id. at 434–35.
76
See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (describing the
States as “quasi-sovereignties bound together in the Union”). Indeed, some early
commentators described Missouri v. Holland (and the case discussed below, Colorado v. Toll) as involving “sovereign interests.” See Note, The Legal Interest Necessary to Challenge a Federal Appropriation, 24 VA. L. REV. 777, 780 n.16 (1938).
See also Lauren Benton, From International Law to Imperial Constitutions: The
Problem of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870–1900, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 595, 596 (2008)
(reporting that, during the late-nineteenth century, “[i]nternational lawyers used
[the term quasi-sovereignty] to refer to the status of sub-polities within empirestates”); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 351, 357 & n.9 (1928) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s use of the term
“quasi-sovereign” as another, somewhat less respectful, way of describing “sovereign” interests).
77
See 268 U.S. 228, 229 (1925).
78
See Bill in Equity—Complaint at 7–8, Transcript of Record, Colorado, 268
U.S. 228 (No. 234). Colorado claimed that, while the State had been generous in
issuing licenses, the relevant federal official (Roger Toll) had granted a monopoly
to one tourism company. See Brief in Behalf of Appellant at 7–9, Colorado, 268
U.S. 228 (No. 234); see also id. at 10–11 (challenging the regulations as unauthorized by Congress or, in the alternative, challenging the statute on Tenth Amendment grounds, to the extent it authorized the regulations).
74
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dustry; the State’s “only claim” was that the federal regulations
“exclude [the State] from control” over a private industry.79
The Supreme Court, however, again in an opinion by Justice Holmes, permitted Colorado to bring the suit. Citing Missouri v. Holland, the Court stated that “[t]he object of the bill is
to restrain [a federal executive official] from doing acts that it is
alleged that he has no authority to do and that derogate from
the quasi-sovereign authority of the State. There is no question
that a bill in equity is a proper remedy . . . .”80 The Court then
ruled in favor of Colorado on the merits.81
This concept of sovereign (or “quasi-sovereign”) state
standing resonates in many ways with more recent state suits
against the federal government, which the Supreme Court adjudicated without discussing standing. In South Dakota v.
Dole, the State challenged a federal statute that required States
to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one, or else risk
losing federal highway funds.82 New York v. United States involved a federal law that directed the State either to regulate
the disposal of hazardous waste according to federal instructions or to “take title” to the waste.83 In each case, one of the
State’s principal concerns was that the federal government was
forcing changes to—and, thus, undermining the continued enforceability of—state law.84
By comparison, however, the state standing recognized by
the Supreme Court in these early preemption cases was indeed
“special.” As the federal government emphasized in Missouri v.
Holland and Colorado v. Toll, neither State was the object of the
federal law at issue; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the
federal chauffeur regulations applied to private parties.85 Ac79

Brief for Appellee at 9–10, 14, Colorado, 268 U.S. 228 (No. 234).
Colorado, 268 U.S. at 230.
81
See id. at 230–32. The problem was, apparently, that the federal executive
had sought to regulate chauffeur services on lands that, although within the park,
were owned by private parties; the relevant federal statutes had indicated that
only the State should regulate chauffeur services on private lands. See Warren H.
Pillsbury, Law Applicable to National Parks and Other Federal Reservations Within
a State, 22 CAL. L. REV. 152, 157 (1934).
82
483 U.S. 203, 205–06, 211–12 (1987) (upholding the statute as a proper
exercise of the federal spending power).
83
505 U.S. 144, 149, 152–54, 174–77 (1992) (striking down the “take title”
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on
the ground that Congress had improperly commandeered a State to enact state
law).
84
See id. at 174–75; South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 209–10.
85
See Brief for Appellee at 6, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (No.
609) (“The Government insists, strenuously . . . that a state cannot become a
litigant merely for the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of a [federal]
80
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cordingly, the States’ only interest was ensuring the continued
enforceability of state law; that is, the State sought to regulate
the private parties itself. By contrast, in South Dakota and New
York, each State also had a more “common law” interest—a
pecuniary interest in federal funds or a property interest in not
owning hazardous waste.
These early cases did not, however, authorize unlimited
state standing to sue the federal government. Each State had
standing only to challenge the federal action that undermined
the enforcement of state law and to seek redress for that harm.
Accordingly, Missouri sought to enjoin enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act “within its borders” so that the State
could once again regulate the hunting of wild game.86 Likewise, Colorado sought to regain control over the chauffeur industry within the State.87 Neither State had standing, simply
because it disagreed with the federal law at issue or believed
the law exceeded congressional or executive power. Nor could
the State contest the implementation of federal law outside its
borders. As in Maine v. Taylor and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
each State had special standing only to protect the continued
enforceability of its own state law.
2. The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction
Scholars have often pointed to cases arising under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to emphasize the limits of
state standing.88 It is true that the Court has been reluctant to
hear original disputes seeking to enforce or to protect the continued enforceability of state law; the Court was particularly
hostile to such claims in the nineteenth century.89 But the
criminal law” that applies to private parties); Brief for Appellee at 14, Colorado,
268 U.S. 228 (No. 234) (arguing that the State lacked standing because “only
those affected by [the chauffeur regulations] are entitled to object to them”).
86
Missouri’s Amended Bill of Complaint at 2, Transcript of Record, Missouri,
252 U.S. 416 (No. 609).
87
Brief for Appellant at 5, Colorado, 268 U.S. 228 (No. 234).
88
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 27, at 392–93, 410–19, 427–28,
431–33; see also Vladeck, supra note 27, at 851–54 (discussing original jurisdiction actions to support limitations on state standing).
89
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 286–87, 299–300
(1888) (declining to exercise original jurisdiction over the State’s effort to collect
on a state court judgment against an out-of-state company because it was effectively an effort to enforce the State’s “penal laws”); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 50, 50, 76–77 (1867) (declining to hear Georgia’s constitutional challenge to
the Reconstruction Acts because the suit “call[ed] for the judgment of the court
upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a
political character”). These limitations on the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction considerably impacted the States’ capacity to invoke federal jurisdiction

R
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Court’s original cases do not undermine state standing to assert such interests in federal district court, or on appeal to the
Supreme Court. Moreover, there is some indication that a
State may (at times) bring an original action against the United
States to protect the continued enforceability of state law.
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to
relax the restrictions on original state suits seeking to enforce
state law. For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the
Court permitted the State to bring a public nuisance action
against two Tennessee-based companies that were emitting
noxious gases into northern Georgia.90 As the State emphasized, it could not sue the companies in its own state courts to
abate the nuisance because the state courts lacked personal
jurisdiction over them.91 Accordingly, Georgia filed the original
action to protect “her sovereignty and her enforcement of her
laws.”92 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
allowed Georgia to bring the action to redress the “injury to [the
State] in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”93

throughout much of the nineteenth century. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction only over state court cases denying
federal rights; accordingly, if a state court struck down a state law as unconstitutional, the State could not appeal. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat.
73, 85–86. Congress changed this rule in 1914. See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2,
38 Stat. 790, 790 (permitting the Court to hear, at least on certiorari, any federal
question case from state court). Lower federal court jurisdiction was also fairly
narrow until 1875; the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not confer jurisdiction on those
courts to hear suits brought by States. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 11–13, 1 Stat. 73, 78–81.
90
See 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
91
See Original Bill of Complainant at 14, Transcript of Record, Georgia, 206
U.S. 230 (No. 5, Original) (noting that the State could not exercise personal jurisdiction over persons or property outside its territory).
92
Georgia, 206 U.S. at 231 (argument for the State of Georgia); see also id. at
231–32 (“The maintenance of a public nuisance is a crime by common law and by
the statute law of both Tennessee and Georgia. The offender is in the State of
Tennessee. The criminal act, so far as Georgia is concerned, is within the State of
Georgia.”).
93
Id. at 237. The Court’s analysis indicates that it viewed the State’s interest
much like the “quasi-sovereign” interests in Missouri v. Holland and Colorado v.
Toll. Indeed, that was the interest asserted by Georgia—an interest in enforcing
state law. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Justice Holmes emphasized
that, if the companies had been based in Georgia, the State could have exercised
its police powers to prohibit the nuisance. Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237 (asserting
that, as a quasi-sovereign, the State “has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air”).
But the State could not enforce its laws against out-of-state companies, so it had
to protect its “quasi-sovereign” rights through an original action. Id. (to protect
the States’ “remaining quasi-sovereign interests . . . the alternative to force is a
suit in this court”).
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It remained to be seen, however, whether a State could
bring an original action against the federal government to protect its interest in state law.94 Notably, the Supreme Court left
open that possibility in Massachusetts v. Mellon, even as it
rejected state standing in the case. Massachusetts involved a
constitutional challenge to the Sheppard-Towner Act, also
known as the “Maternity Act,” which offered federal funds to
States that established programs for reducing maternal and
infant mortality.95 Massachusetts refused to accept the funds
and filed suit, arguing that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment.96 Separate from its claim for parens patriae standing (on
behalf of its citizens), the State alleged that it could bring suit
because the Act invaded its own “sovereign rights” by “impos[ing] an illegal option either to yield to the Federal Government a part of the powers reserved to it by the Tenth
Amendment or to lose its share of the public moneys.”97
The Supreme Court held that this claim of “sovereign injury” was insufficient. “[T]he powers of the State are not invaded,” the Court reasoned, because “the statute imposes no
obligation but simply extends an option which the state is free
to accept or reject.”98 The Court distinguished Missouri v. Holland by observing that, in that case, “as asserted, there was an
invasion . . . of the quasi-sovereign right of the State to regulate
the taking of wild game within its borders.”99 Missouri had
argued that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act preempted—and
thereby rendered unenforceable—its state hunting laws. By
94
The Court rejected a few challenges, without foreclosing the possibility that
a State could bring an original action asserting sovereign interests against the
federal government. See New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 338–40 (1926)
(finding the constitutional challenge too speculative); Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 162–65 (1922) (dismissing the State’s constitutional challenge as too abstract and rejecting challenges to executive action for
failure to join indispensable parties or because the suit should have been brought
in federal district court).
95
See Sheppard-Towner Act, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224, 224–26 (Nov. 23, 1921);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–80 (1923).
96
See Massachusetts, 262 U.S. at 478–80. Harriett Frothingham, a Massachusetts resident, separately challenged the law; the Court held that she lacked
standing to sue as a federal taxpayer. See id. at 478–79, 486–88.
97
Brief for Plaintiff on Motion to Dismiss at 46–47, 51–52, Massachusetts,
262 U.S. 447 (No. 24, Original) (“[T]he Commonwealth is interested in maintaining
the suit in two ways: first, directly, because its sovereign rights have been invaded . . . , and, secondly, as the representative of its citizens . . . .”). The State’s
parens patriae claim was an (indirect) assertion of federal taxpayer standing—that
the “property rights” of its citizens would be “impaired” if they had to pay federal
taxes to support an unconstitutional statute. See id. at 56–58.
98
Massachusetts, 262 U.S. at 480.
99
Id. at 481–82 (emphasis added).
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contrast, when Massachusetts declined the federal funds offered under the Maternity Act, the State ensured that it would
not have to modify any state law. Accordingly, Massachusetts’
suit did not involve “quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or
threatened.”100
In the wake of Massachusetts v. Mellon, many early commentators asserted that although a State could not bring a
parens patriae action against the federal government, it could
sue to protect its own sovereign (or “quasi-sovereign”) interests.101 Some scholars further claimed that States could bring
such challenges in the Supreme Court as an original matter.102
The Court, for its part, seemed to implicitly authorize such
standing in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Oregon v. Mitchell, when it permitted States to file original actions challenging
the constitutionality of the federal Voting Rights Act.103 Notably, the Act required States with a long history of discrimination to overhaul their state election laws.104
In the first challenge, South Carolina argued that it
brought suit to protect its sovereign interest in regulating the
electoral process.105 Invoking Missouri v. Holland, Colorado v.
Toll, and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., South Carolina insisted that, much like the States in those cases, it had standing
100
Id. at 484–85. Once the Court rejected this argument, it was left with
Massachusetts’ final contention that its “sovereign rights [were] infringed” by the
very existence of the cooperative federalism scheme created by the Maternity Act.
See Brief for Plaintiff on Motion to Dismiss at 47, Massachusetts, 262 U.S. 447
(No. 24, Original) (alleging that the Act created “an alien form of government” that
was “neither federal nor state”). The Supreme Court held that the State lacked
standing simply to raise “the naked contention that Congress . . . usurped the
reserved powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the statute.”
Massachusetts, 262 U.S. at 483. The State’s final contention explains much of
the “political question” language in the Court’s opinion, including the comment
that the Court was “called upon to adjudicate, . . . not [as in Missouri v. Holland]
quasi-sovereign rights actually invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of
political power.” Id. at 484–85.
101
See Maurice S. Culp, Methods of Attacking Unconstitutional Legislation, 22
VA. L. REV. 723, 732 & nn.58–59 (1936); The Legal Interest Necessary to Challenge
a Federal Appropriation, supra note 76, at 780 & n.16 (1938); Note, Standing of a
State to Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation and Activities of the Federal
Government, 56 HARV. L. REV. 800, 803–04 (1943).
102
See Culp, supra note 101, at 732 n.58.
103
See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (deciding challenge to the
Voting Rights Act of 1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)
(deciding challenge to the original 1965 Act).
104
See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 315–17.
105
See Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 3–6, South Carolina, 383 U.S. 301
(No. 22, Original) (urging that the Act “arbitrarily, unconstitutionally and unlawfully . . . attempts to restrict and prohibit the Plaintiff’s right to exercise her
sovereign power to prescribe fair and reasonable qualifications for registration of
her electorate and the conduct of her elections, federal, state or local . . .”).
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in its “quasi-Sovereign capacity . . . to prevent the unconstitutional interference with [its] exclusive responsibilities” over
election qualifications and procedures.106 That is, the State
sought to preserve the continued enforceability of its existing
state election laws. South Carolina separately alleged standing
as parens patriae of its citizens.107
The Supreme Court, relying on Massachusetts v. Mellon,
swiftly rejected the parens patriae theory.108 But the Court
decided the rest of the claims on the merits—implicitly accepting South Carolina’s sovereign standing theory. The Court
held that all of the State’s challenges to the Voting Rights Act
were without merit.109
Admittedly, these precedents do not demonstrate that the
Supreme Court will regularly allow States to file original actions to preserve the continued enforceability of state law; as
other scholars have observed, the Court is cautious about
opening its doors to any original suit.110 The important point
for my purposes is that these precedents do not undermine
such state standing as a matter of Article III. Indeed, Massachusetts v. Mellon assumed the validity of the “quasi-sovereign”
standing theory in Missouri v. Holland.
C. State Standing Against the United States: Modern
Cases
This background on state standing has important implications for the modern era. In recent years, States have increasingly brought suit to challenge federal administrative action.111
106
Brief for the Plaintiff at 46–47, South Carolina, 383 U.S. 301 (No. 22,
Original).
107
South Carolina asserted that, as parens patriae, the State could protect its
citizens from the “dilution” of their votes—apparently because the Voting Rights
Act would ensure that more individuals could vote. See id. at 44–45.
108
See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 324 (holding that the State lacked “standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against
the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen”).
109
See id. at 308, 323–34, 337 (quickly rejecting the State’s claim that it had
rights protected by the Due Process or Bill of Attainder Clauses and upholding the
Act as a proper exercise of congressional power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment). In Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court made no finding as to
standing but simply stated that “[n]o question has been raised concerning the
standing of the parties or the jurisdiction of this Court.” 400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1
(1970).
110
For an important analysis (and critique) of the Court’s narrow reading of its
original jurisdiction, see James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 560–61 (1994).
111
See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. That may be in part because
of the Supreme Court’s broad view of congressional power. Since the New Deal,
the Court has been disinclined to police the constitutional boundaries of “state”
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Drawing on the precedents discussed in the previous sections,
I argue that States have broad standing to protect state law
from interference by federal agencies. Outside this context,
however (as discussed below in Part II), States lack special
standing to challenge federal agencies’ implementation of federal law.
1. State Standing to Sue Federal Agencies
A few cases will help illustrate the scope of state standing
under the theory presented here. Gonzales v. Oregon involved
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which authorizes physicianassisted suicide.112 Under the Oregon law, physicians may
prescribe lethal doses of certain drugs to terminally ill patients
who request the medication.113 All such medications are subject to the federal Controlled Substances Act.114 The dispute
arose when then-Attorney General John Ashcroft declared that
“assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’” and
warned that any doctor who dispensed medication under the
Oregon law would violate the Controlled Substances Act and
thereby risk losing his license to prescribe any medication.115
Oregon filed suit, alleging that the Attorney General’s directive exceeded his authority under the Controlled Substances Act.116 Several private parties, including a physician, a
pharmacist, and some terminally ill patients later intervened as
additional plaintiffs.117 Although neither the Supreme Court
nor the court of appeals discussed state standing,118 the federal district court specifically held that Oregon could bring the
and “federal” power. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 37–45
(2009); Ernest A. Young, ‘‘The Ordinary Diet of the Law’’: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254 (noting the demise of
“the old regime of ‘dual federalism’”). There are, of course, still some constitutional challenges, such as Virginia’s suit over the Affordable Care Act. See infra
notes 136–137 and accompanying text. But the heart of state standing issues in
the modern era will likely involve suits against federal agencies.
112
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.867 (2013); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 249 (2006).
113
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.810, 127.820 (2013) (requiring, inter alia, that
the patient’s decision be voluntary and that two physicians confirm the diagnosis
of a terminal illness).
114
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–903 (2012); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249.
115
Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,608
(Nov. 9, 2001) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001)) (emphasizing that the policy
would require changes to the enforcement practices of the Drug Enforcement
Administration only in Oregon).
116
See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079–80 (D. Or. 2002).
117
See id. at 1084.
118
The Supreme Court did not discuss the standing of any plaintiff. The court
of appeals found that the intervening health care practitioners had standing and
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suit. Observing that the directive “essentially nullified” the
Death with Dignity Act, the court found that “Oregon has alleged and proved a sufficient injury to its sovereign and legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own
statutes.”119 (The Supreme Court later held on the merits that
the Attorney General had exceeded his authority.120)
Wyoming v. United States involved a state law that enabled
individuals to get misdemeanor convictions expunged, so that
they could once again purchase firearms.121 Soon after the
enactment of the law, however, the federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) notified Wyoming that, in the federal agency’s view, the state law procedures were not sufficient
to qualify as an “expungement” under federal law.122 Accordingly, individuals who took advantage of the state law would
still be subject to prosecution under federal law for unlawful
possession of a firearm.123 When Wyoming brought suit, the
court of appeals upheld state standing to challenge federal administrative action that “undermine[d the State’s] ability to enforce its legal code.”124 (The court of appeals, however,
ultimately ruled in favor of the federal government on the
merits.125)
Both Oregon and Wyoming involved what I have referred to
as special state standing. As in Colorado v. Toll, the federal
administrative actions at issue applied only to private parties,
not the State. Thus, as the federal government pointed out (in
opposing state standing), Attorney General Ashcroft’s directive
did not “impose any obligation upon the State of Oregon or
prevent the State itself from taking any action.”126 Instead, the
directive threatened physicians who assisted suicide with the
did not comment on the standing of other plaintiffs. See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 1118, 1121 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004).
119
Oregon, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 1079, 1087. The district court did not consider
the standing of any intervening plaintiff. See id.
120
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006).
121
539 F.3d 1236, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2008). Although federal law generally
prohibits individuals with certain misdemeanor convictions from obtaining a gun
license, this prohibition does not apply if the conviction has been expunged. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(9), 921(a)(33) (2012).
122
Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1240.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1241–42.
125
Id. at 1249.
126
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction &
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Oregon for Lack of Standing at 11,
Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002) (No. CV 01-1647-JO).
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loss of their federal license to dispense medication.127 Likewise, in Wyoming, the ATF’s interpretation of federal law
threatened only private individuals with criminal prosecution.128 Accordingly, the State’s only interest in each case was
to protect its state law from federal interference; that is, the
State sought to regulate the private parties itself. But I assert
that such an interest should generally be sufficient for standing purposes—as it was in the Supreme Court’s early preemption cases.129
Notably, the state standing theory presented here also applies in the context of at least some cooperative federalism
programs. Under such programs, the federal government enlists States in the implementation of a federal statute, such as
Medicaid or the Clean Air Act.130 But it is important to keep in
mind that, within these cooperative programs, States do not
act simply as lower-level federal bureaucrats.131 Instead,
States often participate by enacting state law—state statutes
or regulations that adhere to certain federal guidelines.132
I assert that States should have standing to protect these
state laws against interference by federal agencies.133 For ex127
See id. at 13 (emphasizing that the directive at most “limit[ed] the activities
of physicians and pharmacists” in Oregon).
128
See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
129
I articulate below an important qualification: A State has special standing
to protect only those laws that can be deemed regulatory. See infra Part I.C.2.
130
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2012)
(Clean Air Act).
131
The anti-commandeering doctrine underscores this point. In contrast to
federal agencies, Congress may not “‘commandeer[ ] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.’” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (quoting Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Congress must instead induce the States’ cooperation through conditional spending,
as with Medicaid, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (2012); Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins,
540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004), or conditional preemption, as with the Clean Air Act,
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2012).
132
There are, of course, assorted “cooperative federalism” schemes—not all of
which may involve the creation of state law to implement federal statutes. For an
important discussion of the complexity, see generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal
Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 537, 564–74 (2011) (highlighting how “every branch of state government is squarely in the midst of creating, implementing, and interpreting federal statutory law”). A complete treatment
of all this variation, and its implications for state standing, is beyond the scope of
this Article. I seek here only to show that precedent and constitutional principle
strongly support “special” state standing to protect any state laws created in the
context of these programs.
133
See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 864–65, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(upholding state standing to challenge EPA regulations that would require two
States to revise their state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act).
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ample, in Florida v. Weinberger, the State challenged a federal
regulation that would require it to modify part of its state Medicaid plan by reconstituting its state licensing board for nursing
homes.134 The State had standing to challenge a federal regulation that “set a collision course with Florida law.”135
2. Is Any State Law Sufficient?
The cases discussed thus far each involved state standing
to protect a state regulatory program. Thus, in Missouri v.
Holland, the State had a program in place to control the hunting of wild game, while in Colorado v. Toll, the State regulated
the licensing of chauffeurs. In each case, the Supreme Court
upheld state standing to challenge federal statutes or regulations that would preempt—and thereby eliminate—the State’s
authority to regulate private parties (hunters and would-be
chauffeurs, respectively). Likewise, in Gonzales v. Oregon and
Wyoming v. United States, each State sought to preserve a regulatory program—state-defined circumstances under which
physicians could assist suicide, or individuals could obtain expungement of a prior conviction.
Not all state laws, however, regulate the citizenry. Some
state laws may instead declare that private citizens are, or
should be, exempt from regulation by the state or federal government. A recent example may be Virginia’s response to the
Affordable Care Act, which declared that “[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a
policy of individual insurance coverage.”136 Virginia relied on
this provision when it brought suit against the federal government to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate

134

492 F.2d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 493–94.
136
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (West 2015); see Crocker, supra note 57, at
2089 (noting that the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act was “a direct response to
the individual mandate component of” the Affordable Care Act). The Virginia law
contained a few narrow exceptions—to clarify that college students could be required by their institutions to purchase health insurance upon enrollment, and
that noncustodial parents could be required to purchase health insurance for
their children. See Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-3430.1:1; Richmond Sunlight: Virginia’s
General Assembly: Senate Video, https://www.richmondsunlight.com/minutes/
senate/2010/03/04/ [https://perma.cc/REJ9-CJ5M] (March 4, 2010: Min.
32:00) (statement of Sen. Quayle) (explaining that the exceptions were designed to
“ensure that dead-beat parents” would not use the state law as a “shield” against
child support orders, and also to ensure that colleges and universities could
continue to require health insurance).
135
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provision; the State claimed that it had standing because of the
conflict between federal and state law.137
I argue, however, that to the extent a state law merely
declares that private citizens are not subject to legal requirements, and does not seek to regulate private citizens, that is
not sufficient for standing purposes. Importantly, as I have
suggested, special state standing against the federal government is an extension of its “special” standing against private
parties.138 Such special standing most reasonably applies only
to regulatory, not declaratory, state laws.
To understand this point, it is important to consider the
rationale for special government standing against private parties. As discussed, the judiciary has long accepted that the
federal or state government may bring suit to enforce its laws
against a private party, absent any showing of concrete injury.139 The judiciary’s longstanding acceptance of such governmental standing makes a great deal of sense. A government
generally cannot, consistent with the requirements of due process, simply impose criminal or civil penalties on private parties; there must be judicial review (at least after the fact).140
Accordingly, absent special standing to enforce its laws in
court, the government could not implement many laws at
all.141
As I have argued elsewhere, a government’s defense of its
laws is part and parcel of those enforcement efforts.142 In order
137
See Appellee’s Opening and Response Brief at 10, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli
v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058) (“Whenever a
State has its code of laws brought into question by federal action, such that it will
have to give way under the Supremacy Clause if the federal enactment is valid, the
State has suffered a sovereign injury and has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the federal enactment.”). The district court upheld state standing on
this basis, but the court of appeals reversed. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266–67, 270–71 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a “nonbinding declaration” was not sufficient for standing purposes, although noting
that the district court found standing).
138
See supra Parts I.A., I.B.
139
See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
140
See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, § 1.
141
Cf. Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1006 (1965) (noting that the government must rely on the courts “for the
enforcement of coercive sanctions”). Notably, a State must rely on the judicial
system to preserve the boundaries of a regulatory program that permits some
conduct and prohibits other conduct (as most regulatory schemes do). Thus,
Missouri would have resorted to court to prosecute those who hunted without a
permit or hunted during the wrong seasons. Likewise, Oregon must rely on the
courts to pursue any doctor who assists suicide without complying with the
requirements of the Death with Dignity Act.
142
See Grove, Standing Outside, supra note 29, at 1329–30, 1359–60.
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to ensure that it can continue to enforce its laws against alleged violators, the government must be prepared to defend
those laws against constitutional (or other) challenges. That is
why, as the Supreme Court declared in Maine v. Taylor, a State
clearly has standing to protect the “continued enforceability of
its own statutes.”143 Notably, in Maine, the Court recognized
the State’s long-term interest in the continued enforceability of
its law; the federal government, not the State, brought the
criminal prosecution in that case.144 But the Court recognized
that the State had standing to appeal the lower court decision
striking down the state law—in order to preserve the State’s
authority to regulate private parties in the future.
The State enjoys this same special standing against the
federal government. When a federal statute or administrative
action purports to preempt a state law, that decision has an
impact much like a judicial decision striking down the state law
on constitutional grounds; the State is hindered in the enforcement of its law against future private parties. The State therefore should have standing to bring suit against the federal
government to protect its long-term interest in the continued
enforceability of its laws—just as in Maine v. Taylor.
By contrast, the State does not have the same interest in a
law that merely declares private parties to be exempt from legal
requirements. A State need not enforce such a law through the
federal or state court system; nor is any private party likely to
challenge a “declaratory” law.145 In short, a State need not
have standing—against a private party or the federal government—to protect the “continued enforceability” of a law that
will never be enforced.
Although the line between “regulatory” state laws and “declaratory” state laws may be difficult to discern at times, this
line maps onto a distinction that the Supreme Court has drawn
in the antitrust context.146 In Parker v. Brown, the Court held
that state laws authorizing anticompetitive conduct by private

143

477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986).
See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
145
In federal court, a private party would lack standing to challenge a law that
exempted her from a legal requirement because she would suffer no injury in fact.
Nor could third parties easily establish standing to object to the government’s
failure to regulate someone else. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
562 (1992) (emphasizing the difficulty of establishing standing “[w]hen . . . a
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else”).
146
I am grateful to Henry Monaghan for suggesting this analogy.
144
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parties may be exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act.147
But, the Court emphasized, a State may “not give immunity to
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.”148 The State
must regulate its citizens, not declare their actions to be exempt from federal law.149
Moreover, this distinction between “regulatory” and “declaratory” state laws is also consistent with a line drawn by the
Supreme Court in its state standing precedents. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court found that a State lacks standing to
sue the federal government simply to protect individuals “from
the operation” of federal law;150 it follows that a State cannot
simply declare its citizens to be exempt from federal standards.
Instead, the “quasi-sovereign rights” of the State to regulate its
citizens must be “actually invaded or threatened.”151 That is
why, as the Court in Massachusetts emphasized, the State had
standing in Missouri v. Holland; in the latter case, “as asserted,
there was an invasion . . . of the quasi-sovereign right of the
State to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders.”152
This limitation on special state standing (to protect only
“regulatory” laws) also makes sense in light of broader principles of standing doctrine. Standing doctrine seeks in part to
discern, perhaps imperfectly,153 when litigants have an interest
that merits judicial resolution, while leaving many other mat147
317 U.S. 341, 350–52 (1943) (upholding a California program designed to
stabilize raisin prices on the ground that the program “derived its authority and
its efficacy from the legislative command of the state”).
148
Id. at 351; see also id. at 352 (emphasizing that “[t]he state itself exercises
its legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions
of its application”); see also Milton Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v.
Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1976) (“As Chief Justice
Stone pointed out, no state can explicitly authorize conduct which the antitrust
laws condemn. This would violate the very concept of preemption and federal
supremacy.” (footnote omitted)).
149
Indeed, the current test for the “state action exemption” in antitrust law
seeks to limit the exemption to situations in which the State actively oversees the
private conduct that is deemed anticompetitive. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (identifying “two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown”: (1) “the challenged restraint
must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’”; and
(2) “the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself” (quoting City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
150
That was the heart of the Supreme Court’s parens patriae ruling. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923) (“It cannot be conceded that a State,
as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the
United States from the operation of the statutes thereof.”).
151
Id. at 484–85.
152
Id. at 481–82 (emphasis added).
153
See infra note 154 (noting criticisms of standing doctrine).
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ters to the political process.154 The judiciary has long recognized that governments must have standing to enforce and
defend their regulatory laws in suits against private parties. I
argue here that such standing extends to state suits against
the federal government; such suits also protect the continued
enforceability of state laws—given that federal preemption has
much the same impact on state law as a judicial declaration of
unconstitutionality. Broader state standing, as discussed further below, might threaten to erode the limits on the federal
judicial power.155
D. The Case for State Standing to Protect State Law
I argue that States should have broad standing to bring
suit against the federal government to protect state law. Such
state standing safeguards a core principle of federalism. Federalism scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of
state regulatory autonomy.156 Indeed, “virtually all the values
154
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“The several doctrines that
have grown up to elaborate [the “case” or “controversy”] requirement are ‘founded
in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Lack of standing within the
narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert [one’s]
views in the political forum or at the polls.”). I acknowledge, of course, that
standing doctrine has itself been subject to severe scholarly criticism. See, e.g.,
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 486–88 (2008)
(suggesting, in the context of private party standing, that the Court’s standing
jurisprudence relegates the wrong individuals to the political process because it
“tends to admit those who already have access to the political system, and reject
those who lack such access”); see also Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of
Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 381 (1989) (arguing that “modern standing
doctrine lacks a coherent conceptual foundation”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 393, 480 (1996) (arguing that standing doctrine is “theoretically incoherent”).
I do not seek here to wade into that debate. I assume here that there will continue
to be some limitations on who can bring suit. My goal is to show the circumstances under which state governments have the strongest case for “special”
standing.
155
See infra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
156
See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219, 278, 283 (2000) (“[F]ederalism is
meant to preserve the regulatory authority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices.”); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1648 (2006) (arguing that federal
preemption is problematic because “state regulatory autonomy is needed to realize the values that federalism is typically thought to advance”); see also DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 106, 119–21 (1995) (asserting that constitutional
principles and practical concerns support “a vigorous federal system in which the
states play a significant policy-making role”); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1323–25 (2001)
(arguing that “enforcement of federal lawmaking procedures,” which limit federal
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that federalism is supposed to promote—such as regulatory
diversity, political participation, and restraints on tyranny—
turn on the capacity of the states to exercise selfgovernment.”157
State standing against the federal government is one way
to help preserve this regulatory autonomy and its accompanying benefits. Thus, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the State brought
suit to protect its “experiment” with physician-assisted suicide.158 In Missouri v. Holland and Wyoming v. United States,
the States sought to preserve state laws that reflected their
citizens’ distinct perspective on matters of national debate (balancing the interests of hunters with the need to protect endangered species, and the proper scope of gun rights). In sum,
when the federal government attempts to “nullify” state law and
impose a national rule, the State should have standing to protect the continued enforceability of its law—and thereby preserve the preferences and tastes of its own citizens.159
A State has less regulatory autonomy, of course, when it
agrees to implement federal law as part of a cooperative federalism program. But even in this context, as Florida v. Weinberger
illustrates, a State can assert its independence by resisting
federal regulations that undermine existing state implementation plans. State lawsuits can thus be seen as what Jessica
Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have dubbed “uncooperative federalism”—a way for the States to “use their power as
federal servants to resist, challenge, and even dissent from
federal policy.”160

power to enact laws with a preemptive effect, can protect the “‘governance prerogatives’” of States and localities (quoting Kramer, supra, at 222)).
157
Young, supra note 17, at 4, 130 (“The first priority of federalism doctrine
ought to be limiting the preemptive impact of federal law on state regulation.”).
158
Cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006) (noting that Oregon was
“the first State to legalize assisted suicide”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may . . . serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”).
159
Cf. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079, 1087 (D. Or. 2002),
aff’d, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006) (emphasizing that Oregon citizens voted in favor of legalizing assisted
suicide and recognizing the State’s standing to protect the continued enforceability of its statute).
160
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1288–89, 1293–94, 1307 (2009).
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A number of scholars, however, oppose state standing to
protect state law against federal interference.161 Although the
objections vary, these scholars most strongly contest what I
refer to as special state standing: In cases like Missouri v. Holland, Gonzales v. Oregon, and Wyoming v. United States, the
federal statute or regulation at issue was directed not at the
States but at private parties (hunters, physicians, and wouldbe gun owners). Accordingly, the State’s only interest was to
“vindicate its power to govern [the] subject matter.”162 Commentators suggest that, in such cases, only the regulated private parties, not the State, should have standing to bring
suit.163
Although I do not dispute that the affected private parties
could bring suit,164 I do challenge the assumption that States
lack a sufficient interest in the federal government action. In
cases like Missouri v. Holland, Gonzales v. Oregon, and Wyoming v. United States, the federal government did not simply
regulate private conduct; the federal action “nullified” state
law. In such cases, the State has a sovereign interest in the
continued enforceability of its law—just as it does when it defends against a constitutional challenge brought by a private
party. The fact that private parties are injured does not negate
the harm to the State.
Indeed, the State will often have very different interests and
incentives than private parties in such cases. For example, a
hunter criminally prosecuted for violating the Migratory Bird
161
See Bickel, supra note 27, at 85–90 (asserting that a State lacks standing
to assert a sovereign interest “in the continued execution of her own laws without
hindrance from national authority”); Vladeck, supra note 27, at 849–50 (arguing
against state standing simply to challenge federal preemption); Woolhandler &
Collins, supra note 27, at 396–97 (advocating limits on state standing to pursue
“sovereignty interests”); see also Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 69 (2012) (agreeing that States do not have standing to
sue the federal government solely to challenge the preemptive effect of federal
law).
162
Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 214.
163
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 27, at 504 (“The state’s role in
protecting the rights of its citizens in the federal system ought not to consist in
bringing lawsuits to vindicate rights that belong to citizens . . . .”); see also Bickel,
supra note 27, at 88 (arguing that, in litigation against the United States, “a state
should have no recognizable interest in ensuring the fidelity of Congress to constitutional restraints. Only citizens [with personal injuries] have a litigable interest
of this sort . . . .”).
164
I thus do not endorse Aziz Huq’s important argument that private parties
should generally not have standing to assert structural constitutional claims,
even when the private actors are directly affected by the law. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1440–41 & 1440
n.16 (2013).
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Treaty Act (the statute at issue in Missouri v. Holland) may
challenge the prosecution—and the constitutionality of the federal statute. But the hunter has no particular incentive to
emphasize the continued enforceability of state law; after all,
he may prefer to be exempt from all legal requirements. In
other contexts, private parties may be reluctant to “take on” the
federal government and may simply adhere to federal requirements. Thus, a State may often need to take the lead in challenging federal action that undermines state law—as the States
did in Gonzales v. Oregon and Wyoming v. United States.
These differences between state and private party incentives underscore why state standing to protect the continued
enforceability of state law is distinct from parens patriae standing. The State seeks to secure its own authority to regulate
private individuals, not simply to protect those individuals
“from the operation” of federal law.165 The State thus represents its own interests, not those of private parties, in challenging the federal government.166
In recent work, Ann Woolhandler has argued that, even if
the state and federal governments have an Article III interest in
the continued enforceability of their respective laws, “sovereignty disputes” between governments should be permitted
only with congressional authorization.167 This is a forceful argument with respect to the federal executive, whose powers are
created by the Constitution and generally subject to congressional mandate; the executive’s authority to bring suit in federal court should perhaps be controlled by Congress.168 But
the argument is far less strong with respect to the States.
165

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923); see also supra Part

I.C.2.
166
This point helps explain why the Court in Mellon could establish a prohibition on parens patriae actions, while at the same time reaffirming Missouri v.
Holland.
167
See Woolhandler, supra note 27, at 212, 229–30, 233, 236 (urging that
courts should “decline to use their discretion to recognize” “sovereignty-based
suits,” absent congressional authorization).
168
See U.S. CONST. art. II, art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Scholars have long debated
whether the executive should have the power to bring suit in federal court, absent
congressional authorization. Compare Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for
Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 111, 114–17 (1997) (arguing that the executive branch has implied power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment), with Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (contending that the
executive has only a limited power to “protect and defend the personnel, property,
and instrumentalities of the United States”), and Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights
of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (arguing that courts should imply a cause
of action “when a public litigant sues to protect typically public interests” but not
when it sues to protect private interests).
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In sharp contrast to the federal executive, the States’ authority to enforce, or to protect the continued enforceability of,
their laws was not created by the federal Constitution (or federal statutes). Instead, a State’s sovereign interest in its own
laws can be understood as a “reserved” power that is recognized by, but does not stem from, the federal Constitution.169
Admittedly, cooperative federalism programs are different; perhaps in that context, where Congress has enlisted the States in
implementing federal law, Congress should have control over
state standing to preserve state implementation programs. But
outside of that context, state standing to protect the continued
enforceability of state law should not be subject to congressional control. Indeed, it seems unwise to require States to
seek congressional permission for suits to preserve state law
against federal interference.
Alexander Bickel raised a separate concern—that broad
state standing could undermine the constitutional limitations
on the federal judicial power. Writing in the wake of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, Professor Bickel worried that allowing
state standing in such cases would “make a mockery . . . of the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy,” because it
would “countenance automatic litigation” by States to challenge any federal statute, thereby transforming the Supreme
Court into a “council of revision.”170
However, Bickel overlooked the limits of state standing. As
Massachusetts v. Mellon suggests, a State lacks standing to
object to “the mere enactment of [a federal] statute” that has no
impact on state law.171 A State has special standing only when
169
See U.S. CONST. amend X; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155
(1992) (stating that “no one disputes the proposition that ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,’” and reserved other powers in the
States, and noting that the Tenth Amendment makes this principle “explicit”
(alteration in original) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991))).
Notably, my argument does not rely on an assumption that the federal Constitution had no impact on the scope of state sovereignty. “State sovereignty” is a
deeply contested concept. For an insightful discussion, see Timothy Zick, Are the
States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 230–35, 240–55, 288–93 (2005). I
assert only that the States’ sovereign authority to enact and enforce state law does
not stem from the federal Constitution. For many States, such authority necessarily predated the federal Constitution; any government (including those possessed
by the States under the Articles of Confederation) must have the power to enact
and enforce its own laws.
170
Bickel, supra note 27, at 88–90 (“There would then be no need to worry
about who could sue if Congress or the President . . . established a church, or
conducted . . . this or that disagreeable war. [Any State] could sue . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
171
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 483 (1923); see also supra note
100.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-4\CRN402.txt

unknown

Seq: 35

4-MAY-16

2016] WHEN CAN A STATE SUE THE UNITED STATES?

16:26

885

a federal statute or regulation preempts, or otherwise undermines the enforceability of, state law. Furthermore, the State
may seek redress only for that harm—by asking that the preemption be lifted, and the state law restored. As I argue below,
these limitations matter tremendously when a State brings suit
against the federal government, not to protect its own state law,
but to challenge the manner in which a federal agency implements federal law.
II
THE LIMITS OF STATE STANDING
In recent years, commentators have argued that States
should have broad standing to ensure that the federal executive branch complies with federal law.172 This argument builds
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,
where the Court applied what many view as a relaxed version of
the injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability analysis to
hold that the State of Massachusetts could challenge the EPA’s
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.173 In its decision, the Court repeatedly “stress[ed] . . . the special position
and interest of Massachusetts,” strongly indicating that States
are “entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing analysis”
when they challenge federal agency action (or inaction).174
172

See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–26 (2007) (concluding that
the gradual loss of the State’s coastline was a “particularized injury” that was
traceable to the EPA’s failure to regulate and suggesting that regulation by the
EPA could “slow or reduce” global warming as well as the risk to Massachusetts’
coastline). In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts insisted that the Court applied a
relaxed standard to the state plaintiff. See id. at 536, 547–48 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for “[r]elaxing Article III standing requirements
because asserted injuries are pressed by a State”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1082 (2015) (asserting that
the “important point” from Massachusetts v. EPA was that the Court “either
recognized or introduced special standing rules for states suing to protect their
property and other quasi-sovereign interests”); Massey, supra note 10, at 252,
280 (concluding that “EPA approves, for states as parens patriae, a relaxed conception of a case or controversy while leaving in place the hard standard” for
private parties); Andrew P. Morriss, Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 193, 193 (criticizing the
Court for “dramatically loosening the rules of standing” in EPA); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J.
2125, 2184 (2009) (noting that the Court “bestowed ‘special solicitude’ upon the
state in its analysis of standing” and suggesting that courts “accord similar latitude” to private groups “deputized to represent state regulatory interests”).
174
549 U.S. at 518, 520 (“stress[ing] . . . the special position and interest of
Massachusetts. It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here
is a sovereign State and not . . . a private individual”). The oral argument in the
case also indicated that some Justices were inclined to treat Massachusetts as a
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As scholars have observed, Massachusetts v. EPA seems to
give States “a special role in monitoring and improving federal
administration.”175 I argue, however, that States should have
no special license to oversee the federal executive’s implementation of federal law.
A. States Lack a Special Interest in the Enforcement of
Federal Law
States have broad standing to protect their interest in the
continued enforceability of state law, including in actions
against the United States.176 Indeed, I have argued that States
have a special status to bring such actions. As Missouri v.
Holland and Colorado v. Toll illustrate, States may challenge
federal statutes or regulations that preempt or otherwise undermine the enforceability of state law, even when the States
are not themselves the objects of the regulations. But these
cases underscore not only the breadth but also the limits of
state standing. States have special standing to seek redress
only for the harm to their sovereign interest in preserving state
special litigant. During the argument, Justice Kennedy suggested that Massachusetts might have “some special standing as a State” that would differentiate it
from a “big [private] landowner that owned lots of coastline” and pointed to Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. (a case that had not been relied upon by the litigants)
as the “best case” to support such special standing. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05–1120) (statement of J. Kennedy). Justice Ginsburg later picked up on this theme. See id. at
16–17 (statement of J. Ginsburg) (asking the Massachusetts attorney general
whether it made a difference that the litigants here were “a number of States who
are claiming that they are disarmed from regulating . . . ? I thought you had a
discrete claim based on the sovereignty of States and their inability to regulate
dependent on the law Congress passed that gives that authority to the EPA.”).
175
Metzger, supra note 8, at 67 (“The strongest support for the view that the
Court may be assigning the states a special role in reforming federal administration comes in Massachusetts.”); see also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 67–69
(suggesting that this “special” state standing theory was likely needed to garner a
“crucial fifth vote” from Justice Kennedy). That is, of course, not the only way to
interpret Massachusetts. Some scholars have suggested that the standing analysis was relaxed because the State asserted a “procedural injury” arising out of the
EPA’s failure to issue a regulation. See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis,
The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 171, 191–93
(2012); see also 549 U.S. at 517–18 (stating that a litigant “‘accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests’ . . . ’can assert that right without meeting all
the normal standards’” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572
n.7 (1992))). But see Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation,
93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 63, 68 (2007) (urging that the statutory provision mentioned
by the Court did not establish “procedural rights, at least not as such terms have
been defined to date”).
176
See supra Part I.B–D.
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law. Scholars and jurists have overlooked these important limits in arguing for broad state standing against federal agencies.
1. State Sovereign Standing and Preemption
The Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not itself
explain why a State might enjoy “special solicitude” in the
standing analysis. The majority opinion relied heavily on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., declaring that “[w]ell before the
creation of the modern administrative state, we recognized that
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking
federal jurisdiction.”177 But the Georgia case was an original
action in the Supreme Court to enforce public nuisance law
against a private party.178 The case is noteworthy in that it
allowed the State to bring an original action to protect its sovereign (or, as the Court then said, “quasi-sovereign”) interest in
enforcing state law.179 But Georgia says nothing about state
standing to object to a federal agency’s enforcement of federal
law.
Scholars, however, have sought to fill the gap and provide a
rationale for special state standing to sue federal agencies. The
most powerful theory, which was first suggested by Gillian
Metzger and then elaborated by Jonathan Nash, “focuses on
preemption.”180 When “Congress has disabled [States] from
asserting regulatory authority in their own right,” they “have a
sovereign interest in ensuring that the federal government performs its regulatory responsibilities so that regulatory gaps are
avoided.”181 Indeed, Professor Nash argues, the federal government “infringes upon states’ sovereignty” when it “depriv[es]
states of their ability to regulate” and yet “leav[es] a federal
177

549 U.S. at 518–19.
See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
179
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). The Georgia
case, of course, predated Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, to
the extent that Georgia sought to enforce the common law of nuisance, one could
describe the case as involving general common law, rather than state law. However, the case record reveals that Georgia also sought to enforce its state statutory
prohibitions on public nuisances. See supra note 92. Accordingly, I believe it is
reasonable to describe the case as involving state law.
180
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2023, 2037–38 (2008).
181
Id. at 2037–39 (suggesting this theory but noting that it was open to objections); see also Wildermuth, supra note 5, at 318–21 (arguing that States may
challenge not only federal preemption but also the manner in which a federal
agency implements federal law); Weinstock, supra note 10, at 828 (arguing that
“[w]hen the federal government decides to regulate an issue” and preempts state
law, “states have an interest . . . in the faithful execution thereof”).
178
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regulatory void.”182 Accordingly, “States ought to have greater
solicitude” to challenge the “federal government’s failure to regulate,” whenever the federal government has preempted state
law.183
There is reason to believe that this concern was (at least
partly) driving the Supreme Court’s opinion in Massachusetts
v. EPA. The Court suggested that Massachusetts had a special
interest in ensuring that the EPA regulated motor vehicle emissions, because the Clean Air Act generally preempts state law
standards.184 Likewise, during oral argument, Justice Ginsburg suggested that States should have special standing to
challenge a federal agency’s refusal to regulate, whenever the
States are “disarmed from regulating” themselves.185
This argument has tremendous intuitive appeal. If Congress has prevented the States from regulating, shouldn’t they
be able to insist that the federal executive do its job? Moreover,
this argument seems to focus on the very sovereign interest
that I have suggested gives the States special standing: their
interest in state law. Under this view, in a case like Massachusetts v. EPA, “[t]he injury is not loss of land, but loss of sovereign prerogative.”186
But this argument overlooks a crucial feature of standing
doctrine: there must be a link between the injury and the request for relief.187 In cases like Colorado v. Toll and Gonzales v.
Oregon, the States had standing to contest federal agency action that undermined (that is, caused harm to) state law and to
seek redress for that harm. Accordingly, Colorado objected to
federal regulations that preempted—and thus rendered ineffec182

Nash, supra note 10, at 1018–19, 1051.
Id. at 1073–74.
184
See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012) (“No State . . . shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines . . . .”); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20
(2007) (noting that the State’s “exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state
motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted. These sovereign prerogatives
are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to
protect Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing standards applicable to”
such emissions (citation omitted)).
185
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007) (No. 05–1120) (statement of J. Ginsburg) (asking whether it made a
difference that the litigants here were “a number of States who are claiming that
they are disarmed from regulating and that the regulatory responsibility has been
given to the Federal Government and the Federal Government isn’t exercising
it?”).
186
Nash, supra note 10, at 1074.
187
See supra note 54; cf. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for
each form of relief sought.”).
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tive—its own state regulations of the tourism industry.188 Oregon challenged action by the federal Attorney General that
would have rendered inoperable its Death with Dignity Act.189
In each case, a favorable court decision would redress the
State’s sovereign injury; as soon as the court invalidated the
federal agency action, each State could once again enforce and
apply its state law as it saw fit.
By contrast, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the State’s sovereign
injury—the inability to regulate—was caused not by the EPA’s
inaction, but by the provision of the Clean Air Act that prohibits Massachusetts from regulating motor vehicle emissions.
And the only way to redress the State’s sovereign injury was to
lift the preemption—and thereby allow the State to “exercise
. . . its police powers” to regulate motor vehicle emissions itself.190 The State would continue to suffer the injury identified
by Professors Metzger and Nash—the inability to regulate—no
matter what the EPA did (or failed to do).191
188

See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 229 (1925).
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006).
190
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
191
Notably, there was another way a State might have challenged the EPA’s
failure to regulate motor vehicle emissions. Although the Clean Air Act generally
prohibits States from regulating such emissions themselves, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7543(a) (2012), the Act contains a special exception for California. The Act
permits California to establish state law standards that are “at least as protective
of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards” and further permits
other States to adopt California’s standards. See id. at §§ 7543(b), 7507; see also
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that the
exception applies only to California). Separate from the Massachusetts v. EPA
litigation, California had applied to the EPA for permission to issue its own
regulation of motor vehicle emissions. See Letter from Catherine Witherspoon,
Executive Officer, California Air Resources Board, to Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, EPA (Dec. 21, 2005), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/waiver.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DP39-BM4W] (requesting waiver for regulation that would go
into effect in 2009). When the EPA refused to grant a waiver, California had
standing to challenge that decision—and any accompanying interpretation of the
Clean Air Act—because the decision prevented the State from adopting and enforcing state law.
But, crucially, such a lawsuit would have looked very different from the case
before the Supreme Court. The focus would have been the sovereign interest that
States have standing to protect: their own state laws. And a ruling in favor of
California would have redressed the State’s interest in state law—allowing the
State to enact and enforce its own standards for motor vehicle emissions. Such a
decision would not have opened the door to other claims by States that they have a
special interest in ensuring that the federal executive faithfully executes federal
law. Ultimately, the controversy between California and the EPA ended when the
Obama administration took office. See Deborah Zabarenko, US EPA Approves
California Auto Emissions Standard, REUTERS (June 30, 2009), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2009/06/30/autos-epa-california-idUSN304468892009
0630 [https://perma.cc/6ZFG-MNMV] (“[t]he Obama administration . . . ap189
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This point can be expanded to other contexts. In recent
years, a number of States have brought suit against the federal
executive, alleging that the executive failed to properly “secure
the nation’s borders against illegal immigration.”192 Notably,
federal immigration law largely occupies the field and allows
little room for state regulation.193 Accordingly, in this context
as well, a State could argue that, because it has been “disarmed from regulating,”194 it has a special interest in ensuring
that the federal executive properly implements federal immigration law. But here, again, the State would suffer the same
sovereign injury—the inability to regulate—whether the federal
executive took an aggressive approach to “secur[ing] the nation’s borders”195 or instead opted, perhaps on humanitarian
grounds, to allow many undocumented immigrants to remain
in the country. A State lacks a special interest in the federal
executive’s implementation of federal law, simply because state
law is preempted.
2. Federal Agencies and State Interests
Some commentary suggests that States should have special standing to sue federal agencies in order to “preserve constitutional federalism in the administrative era.”196 This
argument builds on a common assumption that federal agencies have few institutional pressures or other incentives to pay
heed to state interests, at least as compared to Congress.197
proved California’s long-standing bid to set its own tough standards for vehicle
emissions”).
192
Colorado ex rel. Suthers v. Gonzales, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1160,
1162–65 (D. Colo. 2007) (noting that Colorado brought suit, seeking an order that
the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
“prepare and implement a comprehensive plan to secure the nation’s borders
against illegal immigration”); see also supra note 1 (listing other state suits
against the federal executive for failing to enforce federal immigration law).
193
Cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510–11 (2012) (holding
various provisions of state law preempted by federal immigration law and stating
that “[t]he National Government has significant power to regulate immigration. . . .
Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration . . . but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal
law.”).
194
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007) (No. 05–1120) (statement of J. Ginsburg).
195
558 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
196
Metzger, supra note 8, at 72–74; see infra note 201 and accompanying text.
197
That is why many scholars argue that Congress should be in charge of
deciding whether state law is preempted by federal law. See Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 699 (2008);
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 871 (2008); see
also Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933,
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Although States can influence the federal legislative process
through their representation in the Senate198 and through
powerful lobbies,199 they have less of a voice in the federal
administrative process.200 Accordingly, scholars in the state
standing literature have reasoned, in an era of extensive delegation to administrative agencies, States should have special
standing to challenge delegated authority. In fact, “ensuring
states access to federal court to challenge federal administrative action” may be “necessary to preserve constitutional
federalism.”201
I believe these considerations strongly support state standing to protect state law from interference by federal agencies.
When the federal executive “nullifies” a state experiment—like
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act or Wyoming’s expungement
law—a State should have the authority to bring suit to protect
the continued enforceability of its law. Indeed, one of the central purposes of this Article is to show that both longstanding
1936–41 (2008) (noting that most scholars assert that “agency power to displace
state lawmaking should be more limited than Congress’s power to do so” but
disputing this point and arguing that courts should defer to agency preemption
determinations).
198
See U.S. CONST. amend XVII; see also Clark, supra note 156, at 1325–27
(emphasizing that the role of the Senate in the federal lawmaking process helps to
preserve federalism).
199
Some scholars have suggested that state officials’ influence depends in
large part on partisan affiliation. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080, 1092 (2014) (arguing that federal lawmakers
pay attention to the concerns of state lawmakers from the same party); Kramer,
supra note 156, at 219, 278, 283 (emphasizing state influence due to the link
created by political parties).
200
Scholars often dispute whether federalism is adequately protected by “political safeguards.” Compare, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559–60 (1954) (arguing that the political
checks in Congress largely obviate the need for judicial review of federalism issues), and Kramer, supra note 156, at 218–19 (relying on different political checks
to arrive at a similar conclusion to Wechsler), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & John
C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1459, 1460–61 (2001) (strongly advocating judicial review of federalism issues). But there seems to be considerable agreement that Congress is more
sensitive to state concerns than federal agencies. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson,
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 762–63, 766, 769–77, 787, 791
(2004) (asserting that “the institutional competence of both Congress and the
judiciary with respect to . . . abstract federalism benefits seems superior to that of
agencies”); sources cited supra note 197.
201
Metzger, supra note 8, at 72–74; see also Massey, supra note 10, at 267
(emphasizing that the “federal bureaucracy . . . lacks the ‘procedural safeguards’
that apply to Congress” and arguing that “when Congress delegates to an agency
the power to grant or withhold the benefits of federal law,” States should have
broad standing to challenge federal agency action).
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precedent and constitutional principle support broad state
standing in this context.
I do, however, dispute the assertion that States should
have special standing to challenge any federal implementation
of federal law. Such standing not only lacks precedential support; notably, the only case relied on by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA to support its standing theory—Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co.—involved state standing to enforce
state law.202 But this theory also seems to rest on an assumption that States have a greater stake in the executive’s compliance with federal statutes than other members of society—
private parties, localities, and even Congress.203
There seems to be little basis for such an assumption.
Many members of society are currently engaged in a national
debate over the federal executive’s implementation of federal
law, particularly its power not to enforce federal statutes.204
202

See supra notes 90–93, 177–179, and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has said little about the scope of congressional standing, but the existing precedent does not seem to support broad standing. See,
e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–21, 829–30 (1997) (holding that a group of
legislators lacked standing to challenge the Line-Item Veto Act); see also United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013) (declining to decide whether the
House of Representatives had standing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act).
Compare id. at 2703–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing on behalf of himself and
two other Justices that the legislature lacks standing to sue when the executive
declines to enforce or defend federal law), with id. at 2711–14, 2712 n.1 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (asserting, only for himself, that a chamber of Congress may defend a
federal law, when the executive declines to do so). A recent lawsuit by the House
of Representatives, challenging the federal executive’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act, may provide an opportunity for courts to clarify the scope of
legislative standing. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14–1967
(RMC), 2015 WL 5294762, at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015) (holding that the House
had standing insofar as the executive spent funds not authorized by a congressional appropriation but otherwise lacked standing to challenge the federal executive’s implementation of federal law).
204
See David A. Fahrenthold, Lawmakers Get Pep Talk on Standing Up to
Obama, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2014, at A2 (discussing debates about the executive’s non-enforcement of the law); Michael D. Shear, Obama Moves Ahead on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2014, at A1 (stating that “accusations of a
presidential abuse of power appear to have gained traction in recent days” and
citing a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll that “found just 38 percent support
for Mr. Obama’s executive actions”). A good deal of recent academic commentary
on the separation of powers focuses on the executive branch’s duty to enforce and
defend federal law. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible
Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 509 (2012) (arguing that the President
should neither enforce nor defend laws that he views as unconstitutional); Daniel
J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1235
(2012) (arguing that “the executive branch should enforce and defend statutes . . . even when it views them as wrongheaded [and] discriminatory”); Zachary
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674–75
(2014) (arguing that the constitutional text, structure, and history support only a
203
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Indeed, this issue may be the most significant separation of
powers concern today.205 Many state officials undoubtedly feel
strongly about particular instances (or general policies) of nonenforcement—as do private organizations, individuals, and federal legislators. But such concerns do not give States, any
more than other groups, a special interest in ensuring that the
federal executive “take[s] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”206 States have broad standing to protect federalism
principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.
3. Modern Day Application: Texas v. United States
These principles help shed light on recent litigation over
the federal executive’s immigration program. Under the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) program, the executive declines to remove
undocumented immigrants with close ties to the United States,
because their children are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent
residents.207 The program also allows eligible individuals to
apply for work permits.208 In 2014, Texas and twenty-five
other States brought suit, arguing that the DAPA program violated both the Administrative Procedure Act and the executive’s

limited non-enforcement power and that, absent congressional authorization, the
executive branch cannot adopt policies of non-enforcement “for entire categories
of offenders”).
205
See supra note 204; see also supra note 203 (discussing a recent lawsuit
by the House of Representatives challenging the executive’s implementation of
federal law).
206
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; cf. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,
23–24 (1998) (stating that private plaintiffs lack standing to assert “abstract,”
“‘generalized grievance[s]’” like the “interest in seeing that the law is obeyed”
(citation omitted)).
207
See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of
U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents, at 4–5 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNQ5-56GT] (directing
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to “establish a process . . . for
exercising prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action, on a caseby-case basis” to decline to remove certain individuals who have “a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident”).
208
See id. at 4; see also id. at 4–5 & n.4 (relying on regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.12, which establishes classes of undocumented immigrants eligible for
work authorization, including those “granted deferred action” if they “establish[ ]
an economic necessity for employment”).
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constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”209
The court of appeals held that Texas had standing to bring
the suit, underscoring that Texas “is entitled to the same ‘special solicitude’ as was Massachusetts” in Massachusetts v.
EPA.210 The court accepted Texas’s argument that it had
standing to challenge the DAPA program, because of its “sovereign” interest in issuing driver’s licenses, and then ruled in the
State’s favor on the merits, upholding a nationwide injunction
against the program.211
Notably, the DAPA program says nothing about state
driver’s license regimes. Instead, Texas’s own state law requires it to issue a driver’s license to any person with a valid
work permit.212 Texas contended, however, that if it refused to
issue licenses to DAPA beneficiaries, its state law might be
subject to challenge as in conflict with, and thus preempted by,
the DAPA program.213 In this respect, Texas was “forced” to
209
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th
Cir. 2015).
210
Texas, 787 F.3d at 751–52.
211
See id. at 743, 748–54, 768–69 (refusing to stay or narrow the scope of the
preliminary injunction issued by the district court). The court of appeals later
issued a final decision, affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction
against the DAPA program. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146, 188
(5th Cir. 2015). The court’s standing analysis was similar to that in its previous
ruling, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of Texas’s status as a sovereign
state. See id. at 151-53, 154-55 & nn. 25–26 (concluding that “the states are
entitled to ‘special solicitude’ in our standing inquiry under Massachusetts v.
EPA”). The federal government sought review in the Supreme Court, and the
Court, on January 19, 2016, granted the petition for certiorari. Notably, the
Court directed the parties to address not only the questions raised in the federal
government’s petition (which focused on standing and the alleged violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act) but also the question “[w]hether [DAPA] violates the
Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.” United States v. Texas, Docket
No. 15-674. The United States v. Texas case was still pending before the Supreme
Court when this Article went to print.
212
See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.142(a) (2011); see also Texas, 787 F.3d at
748 (finding that documentation under DAPA would satisfy Texas state law).
213
See Brief for Appellees at 29–31, Texas, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No.
15-40238). Texas pointed to a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals involving the (related) Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program, “which authorizes certain immigrants who came to the United States as
children, without permission, to remain in the United States.” Ariz. Dream Act
Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2014). When Arizona Governor
Janice Brewer announced that the State would not grant driver’s licenses to
DACA beneficiaries, several beneficiaries brought suit, arguing that this refusal
both violated the Equal Protection Clause and was in conflict with, and thus
preempted by, the DACA program. See id. at 1058–59. The court of appeals
directed the district court to issue a preliminary injunction, concluding that the
plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection claim, but expressly
declined to decide whether the state law was preempted by the DACA program.
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grant driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries. Texas would certainly have standing to defend its state law against any such
preemption challenge. Relatedly, Texas could bring suit
against the federal government, seeking a declaration that
neither DAPA nor any other federal law requires Texas to issue
driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries. But Texas would have
standing because it has a judicially cognizable interest in the
enforcement and continued enforceability of state law.
This point underscores the misdirected nature of Texas’s
current challenge. Even if Texas is correct that the DAPA program requires the State to issue driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries,214 Texas has standing only to challenge that
requirement and to seek redress for that harm—by requesting
a court ruling that would lift the requirement and allow Texas
to apply its state law as it saw fit.215 Texas’s sovereign interest
in its driver’s license regime does not give it a special license to
challenge the federal executive’s implementation of federal immigration law throughout the nation.
B. Functional Reasons to Limit State Standing
I contend that States have special standing to protect their
interest in state law but lack any special role in overseeing the
federal administrative state. My argument relies primarily on
constitutional principle and precedent. But I also believe there
are functional reasons to support this divide between “state
law” and “federal law.” State attorneys general, who control
See id. at 1061, 1063–67, 1069 (stating that the court was “unable to resolve” the
conflict-preemption claim, but finding the claim “plausible”).
214
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
215
A case like Texas v. United States strikingly illustrates the need for a link
between the State’s injury and the request for relief. If Texas filed a declaratory
judgment action, arguing that its state law was not preempted by the DAPA
program (as I have suggested it could), Texas could presumably challenge the
legal validity of the program under the Administrative Procedure Act or the federal
Constitution—just as the State in Missouri v. Holland challenged federal preemption by arguing that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act violated the Tenth Amendment.
See supra Part I.B.1. But Texas would be limited to seeking redress for the injury
to its state law. Accordingly, much like the State in Missouri v. Holland, Texas
could ask that the preemption be lifted “within its borders” so that it could once
again enforce and apply its state driver’s license regime as it saw fit. See id.
(emphasizing that Missouri only alleged, and the Court only upheld, state standing to challenge the application of the federal law “within [the State’s] borders”).
Texas could not seek a broader injunction against the nationwide enforcement of
the federal law. I do not claim that standing doctrine always requires such a tight
link between “injury” and “request for relief.” But such a link not only seems to
follow from state standing precedents but also seems crucial in the context of
“special” state standing, where States already have broader authority to invoke
the federal judicial power than other litigants.
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virtually all state litigation in federal court,216 have strong incentives to protect the interests of their States. But these officials have little incentive to be mindful of the national public
interest in the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of federal law.
Some scholars, however, have argued that one rationale for
the “special solicitude” theory in Massachusetts v. EPA is that
state attorneys general are politically accountable actors who,
unlike private parties, can be trusted to bring actions in the
“public interest.”217 Calvin Massey, for example, emphasizes
that “[s]tate attorneys general have limited resources and are
politically constrained” and will likely target “[o]nly particularly
egregious executive violations of public rights.”218
This argument seems to overlook central features of the
office of state attorney general. These state officials have a legal
obligation to protect the interests of their respective States (by,
for example, litigating on behalf of state agencies, or defending
state law); they have no special responsibility to focus on the
national public interest.219 Moreover, state attorneys general
are elected by the voters of the State220 and often politically
ambitious.221 (Indeed, one political scientist has suggested
216
See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 47–49, 84 & n.1 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013).
217
See Massey, supra note 10, at 274–75, 279 (“Not only is the number of
possible plaintiffs reduced to fifty, the political process within each state will likely
operate to restrain wholesale challenges to the exercise of federal executive discretion.”); see also Mank, supra note 7, at 1783–85 (arguing that, although state
attorneys general might bring actions for ideological reasons, they “must respond
to a broad range of constituents and therefore have an incentive to serve the
public interest”); Metzger, supra note 8, at 71–72 (asserting that “[w]hat does
differentiate the states from private litigants is [the] political accountability” of
state attorneys general, although also noting that political accountability may
“prompt state officials to . . . challenge federal actions that are unpopular in their
states”).
218
Massey, supra note 10, at 274, 279.
219
See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 216, at 88 (“The vast majority of the attorneys general have a duty to litigate, affirmatively and defensively, on
behalf of client agencies.”).
220
See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448
& n.3 (2006) (noting that “[t]he Attorney General is independently elected in fortythree states”).
221
See Clayton, supra note 5, at 538 (observing that, beginning in the 1980s,
the position of state attorney general became “increasingly attractive to a younger,
better educated, and more ambitious caliber of attorney” because States were
allocating a larger portion of the budget to and assigning more responsibility to
the attorney general and that “[t]he new breed of attorneys general have included
individuals like” Bill Clinton); Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS 37, 40
(2003) (“[M]any attorneys general run for higher office. . . . [O]f the 166 attorneys
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that “AG” is often short for “aspiring governor.”222) Accordingly, state attorneys general have strong political incentives to
respond to the preferences of state constituents. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the existing research suggests that state attorneys general often bring lawsuits that are likely to curry favor
with state voters.223
To be clear, I do not mean to assert either that state attorneys general are motivated entirely by political considerations
or that political motivations are a bad thing. Political pressure
may lead these state officials to do a better job of representing
the State in court. For example, the state attorneys general in
Gonzales v. Oregon and Wyoming v. United States may have
been motivated to protect their state laws against federal interference because of state public opinion favoring those laws.224
But I do claim that state attorneys general are not likely to
be particularly savvy overseers of the federal executive’s implementation of federal law.225 Instead, we should expect these
general who served at least two years between 1980 and 1999, more than 70 ran
for a governorship or a U.S. Senate seat.”).
222
Colin Provost, When is AG Short for Aspiring Governor? Ambition and Policy
Making Dynamics in the Office of State Attorney General, 40 PUBLIUS 597, 604
(2009) (reporting that about fifty-four percent of attorneys general who began
their service between 1988 and 2003 eventually ran for higher office).
223
See, e.g., Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining
State Attorney General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609,
616 (2006) (concluding, based on an empirical study of consumer litigation, that
the litigation choices of state attorneys general were heavily influenced by citizen
ideology and in-state interest groups); see also Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the
Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2145 (2015) (asserting that “ambitious attorneys general have proven adept at expanding their base by launching high-visibility legal challenges”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 729–30 (2011) (observing that “Republican attorneys general
running for re-election or higher office in 2010 emphasized issues like combating
child pornography, while Democrats were more likely to highlight the environment”); Provost, supra note 222, at 603 (“Generally, we can expect AGs to push
hard on issues for which they feel confident they will get support from the electorate and from state elites.”).
224
Cf. Eli Stutsman, Twenty Years of Living with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 30 GP SOLO 49, 50 (July–August 2013) (stating that the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act “remains widely popular”). Wyoming’s effort to enable those with
misdemeanor convictions to obtain firearm permits underscores the state support
for gun rights. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text; see also Laura
Hancock, Amended Bill Would Let Wyoming Schools Decide on Concealed Weapons, STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 25, 2015 1:45 PM), http://trib.com/news/state-and-re
gional/govt-and-politics/updated-amended-bill-would-let-wyoming-schools-de
cide-on-concealed/article_39a49d03-48b0-53ca-a4ea-b5c4ca909ac7.html
[https://perma.cc/HXN2-KGSV] (noting that many officials in Wyoming support
concealed carry permits, and that some advocate concealed weapons in schools).
225
Notably, there is no reason to presume that state attorneys general will do
a “better” job of overseeing federal agencies than private nonprofit groups. Orga-
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state officials to bring suits against federal agencies that serve
state, not national, interests—or, at a minimum, please constituents at home. Thus, it is unsurprising that the Massachusetts attorney general pushed for enforcement of federal
environmental law, while the Texas attorney general focused on
federal immigration law. Conversely, Texas opposed the suit in
Massachusetts v. EPA,226 while Massachusetts filed a brief in
Texas v. United States, insisting that the DAPA program is
“lawful, will substantially benefit States, and will further the
public interest.”227 Each state attorney general undoubtedly
channeled the preferences of voters in his home State and
thereby arguably served the interests of the State. But these
state officials had little incentive to focus on the national public
interest.
Accordingly, functional considerations seem to line up with
the constitutional design. Constitutional principle and precedent strongly suggest that States have special standing to enforce, and to protect the continued enforceability of, state law—
even in suits against the federal government. State attorneys
general can, on balance, be expected to protect these state
interests.228 But state attorneys general should have no spenizations like the Sierra Club, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, or the
Chamber of Commerce likely have more expertise with respect to federal agency
action that impacts their members than generalist attorneys general. Cf. NAT’L
ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 216, at 11 (noting the range of functions
performed by state attorneys general). Yet the Supreme Court accords such
groups no “special solicitude.” See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730, 739
(1972) (observing that the Sierra Club has “a historic commitment” to environmental protection, but declining to grant the group standing based on its “special
interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks,
game refuges and forests of the country”).
226
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 & n.5 (2007) (noting that ten
States—Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Texas, and Utah—supported the EPA in the litigation).
227
See Brief of the Amicus States of Wash., Cal., Conn., Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa,
Md., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., Vt., Va., & D.C. in Support of the U.S. at 1, Texas
v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238).
228
I do not mean to suggest that state attorneys general will always enforce
and defend state laws on behalf of the State. Some state attorneys general may,
for example, decline to defend laws based on their interpretations of the federal
Constitution—as illustrated by the refusal of some state officials to defend laws
banning same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia’s
New Attorney General Opposes Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014, at
A12 (noting that Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring declared: “I cannot and
will not defend a law that violates Virginians’ fundamental constitutional rights”);
see also Devins & Prakash, supra note 223, at 2106–07 (arguing that such refusals to defend are motivated in large part by ideology); Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 235–46 (2014)
(discussing nondefense in the states). Nevertheless, I do believe that state attorneys general can, on balance, be expected to protect state interests.
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cial role in overseeing the federal executive’s implementation of
federal law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long granted the States special
access to the Article III courts in order to protect state law. I
argue that States have standing to assert this interest not only
against private parties, but also against the federal government. Accordingly, States may challenge federal statutes or
regulations that preempt, or otherwise undermine the enforceability of, state law. But States should have no special role in
ensuring that the federal executive properly implements federal law. States have special standing to protect federalism
principles, not the constitutional separation of powers.

